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ABSTRACT
Property law is not only sexy but also loaded with moral 
conflict. Many market transactions are suddenly politically weighted 
acts. Can law provide a peaceful solution to the present conflict 
between sexual-identity right claims and conscience? This Article 
argues that law, understood in its textured, common law contours, 
may provide a more peaceful and reasonable solution than (a) 
peremptory claim-rights, (b) positive rules, and (c) markets 
unmediated by law. Properly understood, the common law doctrines 
of public accommodations and contractual licenses are not the 
source of the problem; they offer a potential solution. Authority to 
adjudicate common law liberties should be returned to common law 
institutions such as the license and the civil jury, which are both 
more competent and constitutionally empowered to settle the rights 
and duties of the parties consistent with the requirements of equality 
and conscience. 
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I. CONFLICT AND MEDIATION IN THE MARKETPLACE
A generation ago, state courts gave a gift to editors of property 
casebooks: They began issuing interesting property opinions. 
Property students spend much of their first year of law school 
learning the idiosyncratic rules of possessory estates and future 
interests, easements, adverse possession, and riparian rights, the 
origins of which are often shrouded in the mists of ancient English 
history. Property law is not typically the stuff of drama, scandal, or 
even anachronistic moral scruples. So, students tend to snap to 
attention when they encounter in a case the word “fornication.”1 The 
cases concern whether the law will recognize a right to be a 
fornicator in an apartment owned by a conscientious landlord.2
A couple of decades later, the sexiness of property law is 
diversifying. Conscience and sexual identity have collided more and 
more frequently in recent years, in more varied combinations: the 
 1. See, e.g., State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 5-8 (Minn. 1990). 
 2. See id. 
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same-sex couple against the conscientious florist or baker; the 
adulterous employee against his conscientious employer; the 
transgender student against the religiously affiliated school. The 
stakes in these conflicts are high. Public accommodations are not 
merely locations for the exchange of goods and services but also 
important loci of self-constitution. Business owners and non-profit 
managers pour themselves into their businesses and charitable 
ventures, which come to constitute central aspects of who they are, 
not only as professionals but also as persons. And customers also can 
be personally invested in a transaction, especially where it concerns a 
wedding, a job, or a home. Both sides think that the transaction 
affects much more than what they want to buy or sell; it affects who 
they are as persons. 
Neutral resolutions seem unlikely. Proposals to allow markets3
or plural institutions4 to avoid these conflicts are obviously attractive, 
and they are advanced by very capable, scholarly proponents. But the 
desire remains for some institution or mechanism to resolve 
questions of justice—what is right or wrong to do in each case. Both 
sides in these conflicts agree that principles of justice are at stake, 
though they disagree radically about what those principles entail. 
Both sides claim the authority of civil rights for incompatible right 
claims. 
The lingua franca of American legal discourse—rights5—does
nothing to lower the stakes. If rights of conscience, property, and 
nondiscrimination are understood as absolute and peremptory, then 
conflicts between them must be framed as zero-sum contests, in 
which one right wins at the expense of the other.6 These contests 
 3. E.g., Richard Epstein, Freedom of Association and Antidiscrimination Law: 
An Imperfect Reconciliation, LIBR. L. & LIBERTY (Jan. 2, 2016), http://www. 
libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/freedom-of-association-and-antidiscrimination-law-an-
imperfect-reconciliation/ [https://perma.cc/P7TU-MPYR]; Richard A. Epstein, The 
Problem With Antidiscrimination Laws, HOOVER INSTITUTION (Apr. 13, 2015), 
http://www.hoover.org/research/problem-antidiscrimination-laws [https://perma.cc/N8JT-
TLEC]. 
 4. E.g., ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD:
RECLAIMING THE SPACE BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE (2010) [hereinafter CCG]. 
 5. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF 
POLITICAL DISCOURSE 3-4 (1991). 
 6. These conflicts are framed by some as contests “between gay rights and 
religious liberty,” Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and 
the Purposes of Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 619 (2015) 
[hereinafter Purposes of Antidiscrimination], and by others as conflicts between 
different civil rights, because and insofar as religious liberty is a civil right. See
Richard W. Garnett, Religious Accommodations and—and Among—Civil Rights: 
646 Michigan State Law Review  2016 
leave civil rights vulnerable. In a zero-sum contest, someone’s right 
must either not be given juridical recognition or be justifiably 
infringed. A right that is given no legal effect is not a legal right in a 
meaningful sense.7
Fortunately, conscience, property, and equality rights are not 
all absolute, vested rights in their general, abstract form. Unlike truly 
absolute rights, such as the right not to be enslaved8 and the 
inviolability of human life,9 they do not correlate with fully 
conclusive and absolute duties of abstention. They share some of the 
essential characteristics of absolute rights in that they rule out of 
deliberation various potential first-order reasons for action. But they 
do not prohibit action based on all first-order reasons. Stated 
differently, they are categorical rights rather than absolute rights. 
In our common law tradition of rights and liberties, inherited 
from England and incorporated within the fundamental law of both 
the several states and our national constitutional order,10 rights of 
equality, property, and religious exercise are not reified as two-term, 
fully specified trumps11 over all other legal reasons. They become 
fully conclusive reasons for action, eliminating from consideration 
all first-order reasons and imposing a binding obligation, only after 
they are specified in context as three-term, Hohfeldian jural 
relations12 in reasoned conclusions of practical judgment.13 Before 
                                                                                                       
Separation, Toleration, and Accommodation, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 493, 494-95 
(2015). For present purposes the label “civil” attached to “right” is not as important 
as the normative function of the right and the institution that has the authority to 
settle and specify the right’s normative contours. 
 7. GRÉGOIRE C.N. WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION: ON THE 
LIMITATION OF RIGHTS 55-116 (2009). 
 8. See, e.g., Buckner v. Street, 4 F. Cas. 578 (E.D. Ark. 1871); Forbes v. 
Cochrane, (1824) 2 B & C 446 (Eng.); Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 
499.
 9. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705-06 (1997); NEIL M.
GORSUCH, THE FUTURE OF ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA 32 (2006); JOHN
KEOWN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF MEDICINE: ESSAYS ON THE INVIOLABILITY OF 
HUMAN LIFE (2012); Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 
DUQ. L. REV. 1, 148-242 (1985). 
 10. See JAMES R. STONER, JR., COMMON-LAW LIBERTY: RETHINKING 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 1 (2003); Jeffrey D. Jackson, Blackstone’s Ninth 
Amendment: A Historical Common Law Baseline for the Interpretation of 
Unenumerated Rights, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 167, 222 (2010). 
 11. Compare Paul Yowell, A Critical Examination of Dworkin’s Theory of 
Rights, 52 AM. J. JURIS. 93, 133 (2007), with RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY (2d ed. 1977). 
 12. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN 
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their full specification, they direct judgment by ruling out of 
deliberations specified categories of first-order reasons, thus limiting 
and defining the types of first-order reasons that can be asserted 
against them.14
So, the rights at stake in these disputes are not as absolute and 
unyielding to external considerations as some other rights, such as 
inviolable rights not to be killed, maimed, or enslaved.15 Because 
rights of equality and conscience exclude from deliberation certain 
categories of reasons, they direct practical deliberation and judgment 
in meaningful and forceful ways and are therefore properly 
considered rights. Yet because they do not exclude from 
consideration all first-order reasons, they are not absolute and 
conclusive until fully specified as judgments in three-term jural 
relations identifying duty-bearer, right-holder, and the action or 
inaction that is required or forbidden. 
The first cut at specification is performed not by the blunt 
instruments of positive rules and administrative action, but rather by 
three of the common law’s customary institutions of private 
ordering: private property ownership (especially the powers of 
ownership and license), the contract for services, and the civil jury. 
Taken together, these institutions produce not the sole and despotic 
dominion attributed to common law private property16 but rather 
                                                                                                       
JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 65 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 
1923).
 13. WEBBER, supra note 7, at 116-46; Bradley W. Miller, Justification and 
Rights Limitations, in EXPOUNDING THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY 93 (Grant Huscroft ed., 2008). 
 14. ADAM J. MACLEOD, PROPERTY AND PRACTICAL REASON 173-241 (2015) 
[hereinafter P&PR]. 
 15. The rights at stake in public accommodations disputes are what can be 
called (drawing on the work on perfectionist liberal theorists Joseph Raz and James 
Penner) categorical, exclusionary reasons for action. See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL
REASON AND NORMS 35-48, 73-89 (1999); JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASONING 128-
43 (1978); J. E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 9, 23-31 (1997). In any 
particular deliberation about what is (not) to be done, they exclude from deliberation 
and judgment definite categories of first-order reasons, but not all possible, first-
order reasons for action. Id.
 16. “There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and 
engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic 
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, 
in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.” II WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *2 (Philadelphia, J.B. 
Lippincott Co. 1893) (1769). As Carol Rose has pointed out, reading the 
Commentaries as a whole reveals that Blackstone’s understanding of property rights 
was far more nuanced than this oft-quoted line would suggest. Carol M. Rose, 
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mediated dominion.17 Mediated dominion specifies the boundaries of 
liberties, immunities, claim-rights, and powers all consistent with the 
requirements of religious conscience, integrity, personal autonomy, 
authenticity, and the other requirements of justice, without the need 
for zero-sum warfare. 
On this view, the good precedes the right. No abstract, reified, 
two-term right claim trumps conclusively for all purposes and in all 
cases. The well-formed judgment about rights is always informed by 
reasons, which in central and just judgments will consist of all the 
relevant considerations of the common good18 and will not arbitrarily 
exclude legal norms that bear upon the question. This is true even 
where posited rules are in play. Legislation is purposeful action to 
change some part of a complex and comprehensive system of laws,19
which takes the existing law as background informing the meaning 
of legal change.20 Legislation changes law in some respects but not 
others. So, legislation that declares, codifies, and even partially 
abrogates common law norms can only be understood in light of 
those norms.21
Statutory protections for religious liberty and 
nondiscrimination rights are best understood as declarations, 
codifications, and alterations of common law norms. Those norms 
are settled and specified by common law institutions governing 
public accommodations; posited norms guide deliberation and 
judgment, but do not completely determine it. This comprehensive 
view of the doctrines allows many conflicts over public 
accommodations to be resolved case-by-case according to reason, 
rather than settled once and for all in a conclusory fashion. The Free 
Exercise Clause and statutory protections for conscience and 
religious exercise, such as the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)22 and state and federal 
                                                                                                       
Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 603-06 
(1998).
 17. P&PR, supra note 14, at 37-38. 
 18. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 161-225 (2d ed. 
2011) [hereinafter NLNR]. 
 19. See generally NEIL DUXBURY, ELEMENTS OF LEGISLATION (2013); 
RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT (2012); Daniel Mark, 
Legislative Intent and Purposive Interpretation, 60 AM. J. JURIS. 227 (2015) 
(reviewing RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT (2012); NEIL 
DUXBURY, ELEMENTS OF LEGISLATION (2013)).
 20. EKINS, supra note 19. 
 21. I BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *42, *54, *86-*87, *254. 
 22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012). 
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Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs),23 impose burdens of 
justification on state actors who suppress liberties of conscience and 
use. They do not create blanket exemptions for religiously motivated 
discrimination. Nondiscrimination laws prohibit exclusion from 
public accommodations for motivations that are not valid reasons. 
Exclusion based on valid reasons, especially religious liberty claims 
and distinctions that find support in fundamental law, is not 
prohibited. 
Nor is judgment completely determined by abstract right 
claims. The right of equal access under constitutional equal 
protection safeguards and nondiscrimination statutes does not vest in 
the holder an absolute right to enter others’ private property, even if 
that private property is held open for public accommodation. Rather, 
the equal protection and nondiscrimination rights identify discrete 
characteristics (race, for example) that are invalid justifications for 
termination of a license to enter. Likewise, rights of religious liberty 
under free exercise constitutional safeguards and religious freedom 
statutes are not blanket exemptions from laws of general application. 
The precise contours of common law religious liberties in America 
are contested. But two propositions seem uncontroversial. On one 
hand, at least some states rejected usages of the English common law 
that were hostile to what early American statesmen and jurists called 
the liberty of conscience,24 which was understood to impose non-
contingent duties upon officials and state actors. “The rights of 
conscience are, indeed, beyond the just reach of any human power,” 
insisted Joseph Story.25 On the other hand, those liberties do not give 
rise to a right to act for any justification that can be characterized as 
religious. Individual “rights of private judgment”26 cannot be 
sacrosanct against basic requirements of the public good.27
 23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012). 
 24. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *35-*36 (12th ed., 
Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1884) (1826); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1870 (4th ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 
1873) (1833); St. George Tucker, Of the Right of Conscience; and of the Freedom of 
Speech and of the Press, in VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH
SELECTED WRITINGS 371-76 (1999). 
 25. STORY, supra note 24, at § 1870. 
 26. Tucker, supra note 24, at 373.  
 27. Roger Williams, one of the most forceful early American champions of 
freedom of conscience, used the metaphor of a ship, in which “none of the papists, 
protestants, Jews, or Turks, be forced to come to the ship’s prayers or worship,” yet 
all must obey the rules and authority of the ship’s captain and fulfill their duties to 
maintain “justice, peace and sobriety.” Roger Williams, Letter to the Town of 
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The positivist assumption that law essentially consists of 
posited rules that are fully determinate giving rise to uniform, 
conclusive (often affirmative) duties is not benign. Expansive 
interpretations of positive rules have generated a zero-sum warfare, 
especially when prosecuted, adjudicated, and administered by 
unelected commissions and administrative agencies. All conflicts in 
public accommodations must be resolved the same way, regardless 
of the actors’ reasons for action, how public the venue is, the size 
and circumstances of the relevant market, and many other valid 
considerations that common law norms and institutions are able to 
take into account when specifying the rights and duties of the parties 
in each case. 
In short, to mediate these conflicts reasonably, we need fewer 
rules and more law, less power and more liberty. This Article is a 
step toward that goal. 
II. THE CASES
The first generation of cases concerns whether a landlord 
discriminates on the basis of marital status when he or she declines 
to lease an apartment to an unmarried couple who intends to 
cohabitate, thereby acting unlawfully under nondiscrimination 
statutes in several states.28 In many cases the landlords have won 
because their (direct) motivation was not the prospective tenants’ 
marital status but rather an intention to avoid complicity in what they 
believed to be inherently immoral conduct.29 The landlords, mostly 
devout Christians, were willing to lease to unmarried individuals and 
pairs who had no intention to engage in immoral conduct—friends, 
                                                                                                       
Providence, in THE SACRED RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE: SELECTED READINGS ON 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN THE AMERICAN FOUNDING
155 (Daniel L. Dreisbach & Mark David Hall eds., 2009). 
 28. See, e.g., Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692 
(9th Cir. 1999), withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999); Swanner v. Anchorage 
Equal Rights Comm’n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 979, 
979-83 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Smith v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n, 913 
P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996); Jasniowski v. Rushing, 685 N.E.2d 622 (Ill. 1997), rev’g 678 
N.E.2d 743 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); Att’y Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 
1994); McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723 (Mich. 1998), vacated and remanded 
on other grounds, 593 N.W.2d 545 (Mich. 1999). 
 29. E.g., Mister v. A.R.K. P’ship, 553 N.E.2d 1152, 1159 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1990); N.D. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Peterson, 625 N.W.2d 551 (N.D. 2001); 
McFadden v. Elma Country Club, 613 P.2d 146, 152 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980); Cty. of 
Dane v. Norman, 497 N.W.2d 714, 715-18 (Wis. 1993). 
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siblings, or college classmates.30 As a state high court observed about 
one set of conscientious landlords, they would even “have rented to 
any of the prospective tenants, regardless of their individual ‘marital 
status,’ if they had not intended to live together.”31 Unmarried 
cohabitation “is ‘conduct,’ not ‘status.’”32
Naturally, a conscientious landlord who refuses to be complicit 
in nonmarital sexual intimacy affects the market in rental housing.33
An unmarried couple who cannot rent from a conscientious objector 
has one fewer rental option. This might not be a problem in a large 
city but could be consequential in a small market.34 Perhaps viewing 
their role as declaring and applying law instead of making policy, 
courts that rule in favor of the conscientious landlord have not 
addressed this problem. 
In a few cases, the tenants won because state nondiscrimination 
commissions and appellate courts did not accept the status–conduct 
distinction.35 They insisted that to distinguish marital sexual conduct 
from nonmarital sexual conduct is to discriminate on the basis of 
marital status.36 The assumption here, usually implied, is that marital 
and nonmarital sexual conduct is all the same conduct, and so the 
only difference between the cohabitating married couple and the 
cohabitating unmarried couple is that the latter is unmarried. That 
assumption is contrary to the conscientious objectors’ idea of 
marriage as a moral institution. It reduces the incentives for marriage 
to pragmatism. And it is precisely that reductionist vision of 
marriage to which the conscientious landlords object. Perhaps in an 
effort to avoid being dragged by law into endorsing traditional moral 
views, courts that rule for tenants have ignored this difficulty. 
These latter cases are curious outliers: The status–conduct 
distinction is foundational to Anglo-American law. “Laws are made 
for the government of actions,” explained the Supreme Court when it 
allowed the criminalization of polygamy more than a century ago, 
“and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and 
 30. E.g., Swanner, 874 P.2d at 278. 
 31. Norman, 497 N.W.2d at 717. 
 32. Id.
 33. See Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 240-41. 
 34. Id.
 35. E.g., Swanner, 874 P.2d at 278, 285. 
 36. See id. at 278. The conscientious objectors in these cases follow 
traditional religious teachings that marital sexual intimacy and nonmarital sexual 
intimacy are two different acts. Of course, marital status is derivatively relevant for 
discerning what kind of conduct the couple is engaged in. But the primary 
motivating fact is the conduct, not marital status. 
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opinions, they may with practices.”37 And the distinction is 
foundational to the Supreme Court’s contemporary religion clauses 
jurisprudence which, since Employment Division v. Smith,38 has held 
that secular laws of general application that govern conduct prevail 
over the religious status of the objector.39
The abrogation of the status–conduct distinction in 
contemporary cases involving sexual-identity rights is a striking 
development. It suggests that sexual identity carries great force in 
contemporary law. In fact, it appears to carry considerably more 
normative weight than other rights claims and performs a normative 
task that very few, if any, other legal reasons can perform.40
The primary directiveness of law toward action, rather than 
status, is essential to legal judgment. Great jurisprudents from 
Aquinas41 to Blackstone42 to Hart43 have recognized that law by its 
nature governs choice and action because law is a reason for (or 
against) action.44 In the Anglo-American tradition as expressed by 
Blackstone, law consists of rules of action governing “civil 
 37. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878). 
 38. 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990). 
 39. See Christopher Wolfe, Free Exercise, Religious Conscience, and the 
Common Good, in CHALLENGES TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 93, 94-96 (Gerard V. Bradley ed., 2012). 
 40. Sexual identity is now assuming a power in law that is denied to 
conscience and religious liberty since Smith and is even more forceful than the 
normative strength that conscience enjoyed during the era of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 
U.S. 398 (1963). As explained below, the strict scrutiny review mandated by 
Sherbert and similar cases, and now codified in state and federal religious freedom 
statutes, does not allow conscientious objections to trump general rules in a 
categorical, much less an absolute, manner. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying 
text. 
 41. “I answer that, Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is 
induced to act or is restrained from acting . . . . Now the rule and measure of human 
acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human acts. . . .” ST. THOMAS 
AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW: SUMMA THEOLOGICA, QUESTIONS 90-97, at 3 (Regnery 
1996) (1485).  
 42. I BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *44. 
 43. Hart’s foundational insight was that the scientific approach to law 
obscures the internal point of view of the person who obeys law’s obligation. That 
person takes a law not as a prediction of her own behavior but as a “reason” for 
conforming her conduct to the standard of behavior posited by the rule. H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 90 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter CONCEPT]. 
 44. “Making, acknowledging, and complying with law involves acts of 
rational judgment.” JOHN FINNIS, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: COLLECTED ESSAYS:
VOLUME IV 1 (2011) [hereinafter POL]. The judgment concerns in each case what 
should or should not be done. Id. at 23-45. 
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conduct.”45 Indeed, this is one reason why racial status is an invalid 
ground for legal discrimination and judgment; law addresses itself to 
the choices and actions of persons—moral agents who act for 
reasons, a capacity shared by humans of all races46—and being a 
racial minority is not something one can choose to do or not do.47 By 
the same token, judgment concerning action is not per se invalid 
because action is the practical point of practical deliberation and 
judgment, and therefore of law. To eliminate the status–conduct 
distinction altogether would be to do away with practical judgment 
concerning (un)lawful action, and that would defeat law’s very 
purpose. 
The status–conduct distinction is as foundational to 
nondiscrimination law48 and public accommodation doctrine49 as it is 
 45. I BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *44. The law does not deprive people 
of life, liberty, or property because they are criminals; those in authority may punish 
only for commission of a crime by a person who is proven beyond all reasonable 
doubt to have performed the prohibited action while possessing the relevant intent, 
and they must make the punishment proportionate to the offense. Courts do not 
make people pay damages because they are wrongdoers; legal powers hold people 
liable if and to the extent that they have committed a tort and caused cognizable 
damages.
  More precisely, what Hart called primary rules govern conduct because, 
as John Finnis has explained at some length, norms of obligation concern what is to 
be done or not done. See FINNIS, NLNR, supra note 18; FINNIS, POL, supra note 44, 
at 23-45. What Hart called secondary rules confer powers to make valid, change, or 
adjudicate primary rules. See HART, CONCEPT, supra note 43, at 79-99. One who 
holds one or more of those powers enjoys a status that is defined in part by the 
power (e.g., a corporate executive is one who holds executive power over the 
corporation). But power-holders also are bound by primary rules, unless they are 
above the law. 
 46. See generally Patrick Lee, The Basis for Being a Subject of Rights, in
REASON, MORALITY, AND LAW: THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN FINNIS (John Keown and 
Robert P. George eds., 2013). See also Gerard V. Bradley, Constitutional and Other 
Persons, in REASON, MORALITY, AND LAW: THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN FINNIS 249, 
265-66 (John Keown and Robert P. George eds., 2013). 
 47. See W. Kamau Bell, Black Skin: A Uniform We Can’t Take Off,
CNN.COM (July 11, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/11/opinions/cant-quit-
being-black-can-quit-cop-w-kamau-bell/. 
 48. John Finnis, Equality and Differences, 56 AM. J. JURIS. 17, 27-35 
(2011).
 49. So, an innkeeper cannot prevent a stagecoach driver from soliciting 
passengers in his inn for the reason that the stage coach is a rival of the innkeeper’s 
contracted coach, but he can exclude him for misconducting himself or committing 
an assault. See Markha v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 504 A.2d 53, 55, 56-57 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (deciding whether the discharge of a man carrying on an 
adulterous affair constituted marital status employment discrimination was a 
question for the jury). 
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to all law, including cases where the reason for the discrimination is 
sexual conduct. For example, discrimination on the basis of adultery 
is not marital status discrimination. And the distinction is not only a 
valid, but also a fundamental, reason for the specification of rights 
and duties arising out of sexually intimate relations.50 The distinction 
is particularly important, for example, in ensuring parental 
responsibility for, and the well-being of, children.51 Men and women 
are not assigned random marital and parental obligations by virtue of 
being heterosexual; they incur specific natural duties if they get 
married and have children, respectively. It follows that their duties 
run to that spouse and those children, respectively. 
The abolition of the status–conduct distinction in landlord-
tenant cases is therefore more than a little out of line with Anglo-
American law. To collapse the status–conduct distinction in a case of 
unmarried cohabitation52 but not in a case of adultery53 is to make the 
status of unmarried cohabiter an absolute, trumping reason in a way 
that the status of adulterer is not. The effect of these cases has been 
to invent a sui generis suspect classification for unmarried, 
cohabitating couples.54 Unlike other suspect classifications, such as 
race55 and religion,56 this one cannot be answered by showing a 
compelling reason for the discrimination. In states that have ruled for 
the unmarried cohabitating couples, courts have vested in them either 
an absolute claim-right to rent from the objecting landlord57 or an 
absolute claim-right not to be denied housing within the community 
combined with a power to require the landlord to refute the 
government’s showing of the lack of availability of other housing.58
 50. See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the 
Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1971 (1997). See
generally, Helen M. Alvaré, Marriage and Family as the New Property: Obergefell,
Marriage, and the Hand of the State, 28 REGENT U. L. REV. 49 (2015); Adam J. 
MacLeod, Rights, Privileges, and the Future of Marriage Law, 28 REGENT U. L.
REV. 71 (2015). 
 51. E.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 996 (Mass. 
2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting). 
 52. See McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 727 (Mich. 1998), vacated 
and remanded on other grounds, 593 N.W.2d 545 (Mich. 1999). 
 53. See Veenstra, 645 N.W.2d at 645, 647; Kessler, 388 N.W.2d at 560-63. 
 54. See Veenstra, 645 N.W.2d at 647-48. 
 55. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003). 
 56. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). 
 57. E.g., Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 874 P.2d 274, 285 
(Alaska 1994); Smith v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909, 914, 931 (Cal. 
1996).
 58. E.g., Att’y Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 241 (Mass. 1994). 
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These rights generate conflicts where landlords and other property 
owners within the community share traditional-moral, Jewish, 
Christian, or Muslim convictions about marriage and sexuality. 
A landmark in this line-out-of-line of cases is Attorney General 
v. Desilets.59 Paul Desilets and Ronald Desilets, brothers, together 
owned a four-unit apartment building. The Desilets were Roman 
Catholics and had “a policy of not leasing an apartment to any 
person who intends to engage in conduct” within the apartment that 
violated Catholic moral doctrines.60 A state commission found that, 
as applied to an unmarried couple to whom the Desilets would not 
lease an apartment, this policy constituted discrimination on the basis 
of marital status, even though the Desilets were willing to lease to 
unmarried people.61 The Desilets’ intentions, the reasons for their 
policy, and the objective strength of their reasons, were all irrelevant. 
A couple of decades since Desilets, the sexiness of property 
law is diversifying. In some cities and states, a person’s sexual 
identity can constitute a suspect classification.62 It might even be the 
basis of an absolute claim-right to receive the estate, good, or service 
sought.63 Nor are such claim-rights asserted only against landlords. 
Conscientious objectors now include bakers, photographers, and 
farmers. This latest round of the culture war has sprawled out of the 
apartment complex and into the marketplace. 
A typical example is the case Elane Photography, LLC v. 
Willock,64 which originated from the New Mexico Human Rights 
Commission. Elane Photography, a small business owned and 
operated by a Christian couple, the Huguenins, was found liable for 
violating a nondiscrimination norm after declining to photograph a 
same-sex commitment ceremony. The offense was discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation in a public accommodation, which is 
prohibited by statute.65 But the Huguenins did not discriminate 
because of sexual orientation. Rather, they distinguished between 
relationships that naturally partake of the nature of marriage and 
those that do not, a distinction grounded in their religious 
convictions, and one that was affirmed by New Mexico state law, 
 59. Id. at 233. 
 60. Id. at 234. 
 61. Id. at 235. 
 62. E.g., ATLANTA, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 94-112(a), 114-121(a). 
 63. E.g., State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., No. 13-2-00871-5, 2015 WL 
720213, *14-16 (Wash. Super. Feb. 18, 2015). 
 64. 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013). 
 65. Id. at 77. 
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which at the time defined marriage as the union of a man and a 
woman. Nevertheless, the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled against 
the Huguenins, holding that a state rule prohibiting sexual orientation 
discrimination also “protects conduct that is inextricably tied to 
sexual orientation,” such as participating in a same-sex commitment 
ceremony.66
No corner of the marketplace is untouched by these disputes. 
Take, for example, Boston Catholic Charities,67 District of Columbia 
Catholic Charities,68 Evangelical Child and Family Agency,69 Gordon 
College,70 the Sisters of St. Joseph of Boston,71 Melissa and Aaron 
Klein,72 Jack Phillips,73 Barronelle Stutzman,74 Betty and Dick 
Odgaard,75 Donald and Evelyn Knapp,76 and Cynthia and Robert 
Gifford.77 All of these parties, and many more, have found the new 
sexual-identity rights at the doors of their enterprises. 
The policies of these organizations and businesses raise 
difficult questions about the reasons for discrimination, particularly 
about which reasons are valid legal reasons. None of those 
conscientious objectors named above were generally unwilling to 
serve people attracted to the same sex. Many of them employed and 
shared friendships with homosexual individuals.78 Rather, the 
accused drew the line at refusing to participate in what they 
understood to be a falsehood: The celebration or commemoration of 
a marriage between two people of the same sex. They remained 
willing and ready to serve same-sex customers for other purposes. 
But is there still room in the law for such nuanced distinctions? 
 66. Id. at 62. 
 67. See RYAN T. ANDERSON, TRUTH OVERRULED: THE FUTURE OF 
MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 88 (2015). 
 68. See id.
 69. See id. at 89. 
 70. See id. at 91-92; Tina McCormick, Gordon College Prevailed, but Will 
the Country?, NEW BOS. POST (Dec. 8, 2015, 3:11 PM) http://newbostonpost.com/ 
2015/12/08/gordon-college-prevailed-but-will-the-country/ [https://perma.cc/6T3F-PASP].  
 71. See ASSOCIATED PRESS, Judge Rules Against Milton Catholic School in 
Gay-Hiring Retraction, NEW BOS. POST (Dec. 17, 2015, 3:28 PM) http:// 
newbostonpost.com/2015/12/17/judge-rules-against-milton-catholic-school-in-gay-
hiring-retraction/ [https://perma.cc/8GT9-TQ87]. 
 72. See ANDERSON, supra note 67, at 93-95. 
 73. See id. at 95-96. 
 74. See id. at 96-98. 
 75. See id. at 98-99. 
 76. See id. at 100. 
 77. See id. at 100-01. 
 78. See id. at 96-99. 
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III. THE CONFLICT
These disputes will not resolve themselves. Conscience and 
sexual identity both have a non-negotiableness about them. Both 
sides are intellectually, emotionally, and morally invested in the 
outcome because both sides understand the transaction to reflect 
upon their deepest commitments and personal identities. Both 
religious-liberty claimants and sexual-identity right claimants 
describe their motivations in personal terms of self-constitution, 
integrity, authenticity, first principles, moral or religious duty, and 
personal liberty. 
A classic statement of the tradition on conscience espouses that 
conscience, as a capacity of practical reason, guides us toward 
perfection not by determining our choices and actions but rather by 
giving us knowledge of those first principles that direct us toward 
our fulfillment, leaving open (many of) our own judgments about the 
implications of those principles.79 Commenting on this tradition, 
Christopher Tollefsen says, “Judgments of conscience are our final 
verdict on how we are to constitute ourselves.”80 And the capacity for 
the sort of self-constitution of which conscience partakes is, the 
tradition teaches, the ontological and moral foundation of our 
rights.81
Echoing that older tradition of religious conscience, LGBT 
activist, law professor, and EEOC commissioner Chai Feldblum has 
encouraged LGBT people to consider the implications of LGBT 
rights for what she calls belief liberty82—a liberty to constitute 
oneself according to one’s moral judgments. Belief liberty protects 
the right to be true to that aspect of one’s identity which is bound up 
in those beliefs one holds that “form a core aspect of the individual’s 
 79. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, I.2 Q.91, A.2, Q.94 A.4, and 
Q.95 A.2 (Blackfriars ed. 2007). 
 80. Christopher Tollefsen, Conscience, Religion, and the State, in
CHALLENGES TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 111, 113-14 
(Gerard V. Bradley ed., 2012). 
 81. Tollefsen explains that a human being’s two-fold capacity for self-
constitution—judgment and freedom—“is surely the respect in which we differ most 
profoundly from the other animals—and the feature by virtue of which we are to be 
considered persons, not things, creatures with dignity and subjects of rights, beings 
made in the image of God.” Id. at 114. Compare John Finnis, The Priority of 
Persons Revisited, 58 AM. J. JURIS. 45, 53 (2013), with Patrick Lee and Robert P. 
George, The Nature and Basis of Human Dignity, 21 RATIO JURIS. 173, 173 (2008). 
 82. Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Liberty: Gay Rights and 
Religion, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 61, 83 (2006). 
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sense of self and purpose in the world,” whatever those beliefs may 
be.83
Furthermore, both sides believe that they are constituting 
themselves according to commitments that are objectively true.
Religious believers and sexual-identity claimants both seem to think 
that the moral status that grounds their right claims is beyond the 
competence of human agents to alter. With such immutable, and in 
some cases inscrutable, commitments at stake, the disputants in these 
conflicts are unlikely to compromise on their own. 
Those who assert religious liberty claims generally understand 
their rights to be grounded in a prior duty to obey their conscience, 
which is in turn grounded in understanding of, and conformity of 
mind and will to, an objective moral order, natural law, or the 
commands of God himself. They can appeal to rich traditions 
concerning moral conscience (stretching at least back to Socrates) 
and religious conscience (found in the Hebrew scriptures, among 
other ancient sources). Classic statements of these traditions, 
including Sophocles’ Antigone, Martin Luther King Jr.’s Letter From 
a Birmingham Jail, and Pope Paul VI’s Dignitatis Humanae, all 
begin not with one’s rights but rather with one’s obligation to some 
higher source of truth and meaning. Jesus Christ’s admonition that 
his followers must render to Caesar what is Caesar’s and to God 
what is God’s84 presupposes that it is a matter of obligations all the 
way down. Though one’s obligations might come into conflict, the 
most supreme of them is always binding, often immutable, and 
sometimes non-contingent. 
Three aspects of this tradition deserve attention. First, moral 
and religious conscience instantiate an important part of practical 
reasonableness,85 that architectonic good in which people participate 
when they order their lives according to chosen goods (and not other 
possible goods) and particular plans of action for achieving those 
goods (as opposed to other possible plans of action), all consistent 
with basic moral principles and commitments.86 The exercise of 
practical reason, and participation in the good of practical 
 83. Id.
 84. Mark 12:17; Matthew 22:21. 
 85. Tollefsen, supra note 80, at 112-13. 
 86. See FINNIS, NLNR, supra note 18, at 81-133; JOHN FINNIS, Practical 
Reason’s Foundations, in REASON IN ACTION: COLLECTED ESSAYS: VOLUME I 19-40
(2012).
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reasonableness, resembles the good of personal autonomy87 in that it 
entails self-constitution in what Thomas Aquinas called the “order 
that reason in deliberating establishes in the operation of the will.”88
Unlike the order of the material world, one can sensibly speak of 
constituting oneself in the order of the will as one chooses and acts 
for reasons, making those reasons one’s own reasons for acting, 
while rejecting or abjuring other possible reasons. 
Obedience to moral conscience is self-constituting in this way. 
By acting for certain reasons one constitutes oneself as someone 
willing to act for those reasons. By not acting for certain reasons one 
does not allow those reasons to become part of one’s willing or to be 
grasped by one’s will, and thereby one excludes those reasons from 
one’s character. Religious conscience also shares this self-
constituting aspect.89 To act for the reason of pleasing God is to 
become a religious adherent. To act in obedience to God’s 
commands as expressed by the Muslim faith is to become a Muslim, 
or by the Roman Catholic faith to become a Roman Catholic. The 
identity constituted by religious adherence determines future 
actions.90 One who understands Islam to be true acts with integrity 
only by obeying the teachings of Islam. 
Obedience to conscience is not a relinquishment or 
abandonment of self-constitution and personal identity. For each 
person is free to choose whether or not to follow a being whom they 
are taught or come to understand is God. The choice to allow (one’s 
understanding of) God to order one’s goods, to author at least some 
part of one’s plans of action, and to rule out those reasons for action 
that one will not execute, if it is made freely and without coercion, is 
itself a choice and plan of action of one’s own authorship. And after 
that choice is made, the conscientious person enters into a 
cooperating agency with God.91 So, in central, non-defective 
instances of religious belief, the act of choosing not to constitute all 
aspects of one’s identity and to leave some of the authorship up to 
God is itself an exercise of self-constitution and self-authorship. 
 87. About the value of personal autonomy, compare JOSEPH RAZ, THE
MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986) [hereinafter MOF], with ROBERT P. GEORGE,
MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY (1993). 
 88. THOMAS AQUINAS, COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE’S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
1-2 (C. J. Litzinger trans., Notre Dame: Dumb Ox 1993). 
 89. Tollefsen, supra note 80, at 113-14. 
 90. Id. at 117. 
 91. Id. at 118. 
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Nevertheless, the tradition teaches that one must submit to the 
truth that one encounters. The correspondence of conscience to one’s 
understanding of moral or religious truth highlights the second aspect 
of the tradition, which holds that conscience must be at liberty 
because it has a prior obligation to obey truth.92 “Conscience has 
rights,” Newman explained to the Duke of Norfolk, “because it has 
duties.”93 Those duties are to testify about and obey what is 
objectively true. Thus, the architectonic role that moral and religious 
conscience play in ordering the values and commitments of one’s life 
is supposed to be secondary to the proper ordering of conscience 
itself. Conscience is not its own boss. It is supposed to be oriented 
toward the truth about matters moral and religious.94
There is a third aspect to religious conscience that it does not 
generally share with moral conscience, self-constitution, and 
practical reasonableness. The ordering of one’s will toward the will 
of one’s creator in a way that is (from the internal perspective of the 
religious believer) uniquely good and right95 is a value that is not 
reducible to personal identity or self-constitution. It is not even fully 
discerned or measured by reference to morality and practical 
reasonableness. Religious people grasp as truth that religious 
exercise, and obedience to religious conscience in particular, has 
value that is unique and transcendent. It involves harmony with the 
uncaused Cause of all goodness, which the major religions identify 
as God, and is therefore not reducible to human will, nature, or 
genetic determinism.96 The identity that results in the will from those 
 92. Id. at 114-16. 
 93. Letter from John Henry Newman to the Duke of Norfolk (Dec. 27, 
1874), in A LETTER ADDRESSED TO HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF NORFOLK ON OCCASION
OF MR. GLADSTONE’S RECENT EXPOSTULATION 58 (1875) [hereinafter LETTER TO 
NORFOLK]. 
 94. This was the understanding of conscience that served as the justification 
for religious freedom expressed in DIGNITATIS HUMANAE:
It is in accordance with their dignity as persons—that is, beings 
endowed with reason and free will and therefore privileged to bear 
personal responsibility—that all men should be at once impelled by 
nature and also bound by a moral obligation to seek the truth, especially 
religious truth. They are also bound to adhere to the truth, once it is 
known, and to order their whole lives in accord with the demands of 
truth. However, men cannot discharge these obligations in a manner in 
keeping with their own nature unless they enjoy immunity from external 
coercion as well as psychological freedom. 
POPE PAUL VI, DIGNITATIS HUMANAE ¶ 2 (1965). 
 95. Tollefsen, supra note 80, at 116-19. 
 96. LETTER TO NORFOLK, supra note 93, at 57. Thus, Newman wrote, 
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choices and actions is an identity of one’s own authorship. By 
contrast, obedience to religious conscience is a willful choice to 
make another being, a superior and benevolent being, at least part 
author of one’s identity. 
The conscience tradition holds that everyone is obedient to 
something. To be obedient to one’s desires and passions is to serve 
those desires and passions. It is to be enslaved to vice, Aristotle 
thought,97 or to sin, thought Saint Paul.98 By contrast, a person 
obedient to Divine Law follows and participates in promulgating 
“the voice of God in the nature and heart of man.”99 The Word of 
God coming from the voice of God is, according to the tradition, 
both the law written on every human heart100 and the means by which 
God brought all good things into existence.101 The Word of God 
authors all good things and continues to sustain all good things.102
Obedience to conscience is therefore to allow the Author of all good 
things to co-author one’s own life. 
The more recent idea that sexual identity is a meaningful 
source of obligations tends to jettison that third aspect of the older 
tradition. Yet it resembles the older teachings about conscience in 
other ways. Like conscience, sexual orientation and gender identity 
are often described from a first-person perspective in terms of being 
faithful to enduring truths. To be open about one’s sexual orientation 
is to recognize an “inherent or immutable enduring emotional, 
romantic or sexual attraction to other people,” according to the 
leading LGBT rights group, Human Rights Campaign.103 Sexual 
                                                                                                       
Conscience is not a long-sighted selfishness, nor a desire to be 
consistent with oneself; but it is a messenger from Him, who, both in 
nature and in grace, speaks to us behind a veil, and teaches and rules us 
by His representatives. Conscience is the aboriginal Vicar of Christ, a 
prophet in its informations, a monarch in its peremptoriness, a priest in 
its blessings and anathemas, and, even though the eternal priesthood 
throughout the Church could cease to be, in it the sacerdotal principle 
would remain and would have a sway. 
Id.
 97. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 23 (Roger Crisp ed. & trans., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 2000). 
 98. Romans 7. 
 99. LETTER TO NORFOLK, supra note 93, at 56. 
 100. Romans 2:1-16. 
 101. Genesis 1-2. 
 102. John 1:1-5. 
 103. Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Definitions, HUMAN RIGHTS
CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity-
terminology-and-definitions [https://perma.cc/YP8W-GGW5] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016). 
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identity looks very much like a self-constituting judgment about 
what makes one flourish. This is an equal denominator to which 
aspects of the older conscience tradition and sexual-choice beliefs 
can be reduced.104
Nevertheless, the difference between the older conscience 
tradition and the newer sexual-identity belief tradition has important 
implications for the present conflict between the traditions. The 
truths that inform a well-formed moral or religious conscience are 
found in natural law or in the laws of nature’s God, external to the 
believer. By contrast, the truths that inform sexual identity seem to 
come from no source other than the first person and are found within. 
With regard to sexual identity, the enduring truths are truths about 
oneself, and especially about one’s feelings and desires. 
Feldblum’s notion of belief liberty is self-referential in this 
way. She explains, 
From a liberty perspective, whether these beliefs stem from a religious 
source or from a secular source is irrelevant. What is common among 
these belief systems, and what should be relevant for the liberty analysis, 
is that these beliefs form a core aspect of the individual’s sense of self and 
purpose in the world.105
Feldblum places no special value in religious belief as opposed 
to secular beliefs.106 The value of a belief is derived not from its 
correspondence with theological, metaphysical, or moral truths but 
 104. Martha Nussbaum argues that conscience liberty, understood as a 
principle of equality, would counsel in favor of the freedom of nineteenth-century 
Mormons to practice polygamy. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF 
CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 175-98 
(2008).
 105. Feldblum, supra note 82, at 83. 
 106. Feldblum’s view that religion is not a distinct good, valuable in its own 
right, but is reducible to authenticity, self-constitution, free choice, integrity, or 
some other architectonic good or practice is shared by Ronald Dworkin, Christopher 
Eisgruber, Lawrence Sager, and Micah Schwartzman, among others. See generally
RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD (2013); CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & 
LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007); Micah 
Schwartzman, What if Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012). 
Against that view, defenders of the older tradition consider religion as a basic good 
in its own right, irreducible to and incommensurable with other human goods. See
FINNIS, NLNR, supra note 18, at 81-97, 371-410; JOHN FINNIS, RELIGION AND 
PUBLIC REASONS: COLLECTED ESSAYS: VOLUME V (2011); Christopher Tollefsen, 
Conscience, Religion and the State, 54 AM. J. JURIS. 93 (2009); Melissa Moschella, 
Beyond Equal Liberty: Religion as a Distinct Human Good and the Implications for 
Religious Freedom, J. L. & RELIGION (forthcoming, March 2017). 
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rather from the fact that it is an individual’s belief, and therefore part 
of that individual’s identity.107
In other words, Feldblum’s belief liberty secures the 
architectonic aspect of moral and religious conscience, that aspect of 
religious obedience and exercise that religion shares with practical 
reasonableness and self-constitution generally: The ordering of 
goods and plans of action in one’s life that makes person A into 
Person A, rather than some other person. The referent here is not the 
truth of the belief—its correspondence with an objective good or 
standard outside the person who holds it—but rather its 
authenticity—that the person who holds it is true to her own identity. 
This might make sexual identity claims particularly resistant to 
conflict-free resolution and antithetical to live-and-let-live liberties. 
As Sherif Girgis explains, “If your most valuable, defining core 
just is the self that you choose to express, there can be no real 
difference between you as a person, and your acts of self-expression; 
I can’t affirm you and oppose those acts.”108 Sexual identity cannot 
leave others free not to affirm the acts of self-expression that arise 
out of obligation to, and partly constitute, the self. For a 
conscientious objector to abstain from affirming the expressed self of 
the sexual identity claimant is, from the claimant’s perspective, to 
deny that claimant’s very existence.109 To refuse to participate in the 
sexual-identity claimant’s act of self-expression is the same as 
affirmatively condemning that person.110
This account resets the baseline from liberty to identity-
affirmance, so that “laws that depart from traditional sexual 
morality”111 are viewed as the primary source of obligation and the 
 107. She argues, 
An individual’s deeply held beliefs may derive from religious sources, 
from purely secular sources or from spiritual sources that are not 
traditionally viewed as religious. If these beliefs are an integral part of the 
person’s sense of self, my argument is that they constitute belief liberty. . . . 
A belief derived from a religious faith should be accorded no more
weight—and no less weight—than a belief derived from a non-religious 
source.
Feldblum, supra note 82, at 102. 
 108. Sherif Girgis, Obergefell and the New Gnosticism, FIRST THINGS (June 
28, 2016), https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2016/06/obergefell-and-the-new- 
gnosticism [https://perma.cc/4ZMJ-VERB]. 
 109. Id.
 110. This is the view assumed in Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, 
Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics,
124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2516 (2015). 
 111. Id. at 2520. 
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liberty of conscientious objectors not to affirm the new sexual 
morality can be viewed as “exemptions” from law.112 A liberty of 
conscience, when invoked by a culturally powerful group such as 
traditional Christians, amounts to a “special advantage.”113 This reset 
shifts the burdens of proof and persuasion against liberty. 
Furthermore, those liberty “exemptions” are viewed as costly. 
Accommodating the conscience claimant in her desire not to 
participate in affirming another’s sexual identity is a source of 
“dignitary harm” imposed on the sexual-identity claimant.114
As Douglas NeJaime and Reva B. Siegel explain, “[T]he 
bakery owner who turns away a same-sex couple treats that 
particular couple as sinners.”115 That treatment demeans the same-sex 
couple from the couple’s perspective; it leaves them feeling “low,” 
“hurt and disgusted,” “shell-shocked,” and “horrible.”116 The feelings 
are evidence that the same-sex couple’s very identity is jeopardized 
by the religious baker’s refusal to participate in its expression. The 
dignitary harm suffered here is what Girgis calls “moral stigma—the
harm of being told (even just by deeds) that decisions central to your 
identity are immoral.”117 (Of course, the same stigma attaches to the 
conscientious objector who is forced by the state to bake the cake; 
she is being condemned for violating the norm against 
discrimination, after all. It seems, therefore, that dignitary harm 
should weigh on both sides, if not equally then at least in some 
measure proportionate to the stigma).118
This is all quite mysterious from the Christian bakery owner’s 
perspective. In her view, her abstention is not demeaning to anyone 
 112. Id.
 113. Id. at 2584. Girgis argues that this characterization is “tendentious.” 
Sherif Girgis, Nervous Victors, Illiberal Measures: A Response to Douglas NeJaime 
and Reva Siegel, YALE L.J. F. 399, 403 (Mar. 16, 2016). “It assumes that the default 
in a constitutional democracy is not to protect conscience claims that might make a 
political splash. Only then does protecting them anyway seem like favoritism.” Id.
 114. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 110, at 2574-78. 
 115. Id. at 2576. 
 116. Id. at 2577. 
 117. Girgis, Nervous Victors, supra note 113, at 404.  
 118. Girgis identifies two problems with counting moral stigma against 
religious liberty. “First, counting it can be self-undermining because fear of it can be 
self-fulfilling. The more that we—or officials, in weighing complicity claims—say 
that a policy or belief expresses disdain for a group, the more it will take on that 
social meaning.” Id. The second problem is that “in many disputes, both sides could 
claim with equal force that a decision against them would morally stigmatize them.” 
Id.
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because Christians believe that everyone is a sinner,119 including her. 
An essential function of religious and moral conscience according to 
the Christian tradition is precisely to inform the sinner when he or 
she is sinning.120 Far from demeaning the Christian, the conviction 
that the Christian is sinning is an essential aspect of being human and 
a first step toward repentance and restoration to God.121 Therefore, to 
many religious believers the notion that they are causing dignitary 
harm by abstaining from participation in the same-sex couple’s self-
expression is incomprehensible. 
Yet from the same-sex couple’s perspective, the religious 
believer’s abstention is not merely a moral expression about the 
conduct and the nature of marriage but also a “status-based 
judgment[].”122 The existential urgency of the sexual-identity 
claimant’s self-expression and the conscientious objector’s refusal to 
participate in it combine to “extend, rather than settle, conflict.”123
The conflict must be resolved by removing the stigma. So on this 
view, the law justly forces the conscientious objector to act; it 
imposes on the baker an affirmative duty, eliminating her liberty of 
abstention.
Belief liberty claims might be less amenable to mediation than 
conscience claims for another reason. The older tradition teaches that 
conscience concerns practical reason124—a knowledge of the good 
that corresponds with and is directed toward goods that are both 
within and external to the conscientious person, and accessible to all 
through reason.125 The external referent for moral and religious 
conscience makes conscience claims contestable on mutually 
accessible grounds. Claims of moral conscience are grounded in the 
teachings of reason or the natural law, and can be critiqued on that 
footing (see, e.g., The Crito by Plato and King’s Letter From a 
Birmingham Jail). Claims of religious conscience can be assessed by 
reference to the religious tradition from which they are drawn or 
sacred texts in which they are grounded (see, e.g., Sophocles’ 
Antigone, Sir Thomas More, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer). 
 119. Romans 3:23. 
 120. Romans 2. 
 121. 1 John 1:9. 
 122. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 110, at 2576-77. 
 123. Id. at 2520. 
 124. Michael P. Moreland, Practical Reason and Subsidiarity: Response to 
Robert K. Vischer, Conscience and the Common Good, 49 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD.
319, 321-23 (2010). 
 125. FINNIS, NLNR, supra note 18, at 59-96. 
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Robert Vischer puts it concisely: “The moral convictions that 
make up conscience connect the individual to something outside 
herself, to a perception of self-transcendent reality.”126 That 
perception can be shared, even where there is disagreement about, or 
imperfect understanding of, its contents. Friends of (fictional) 
Antigone and (historical) Socrates, King, More, and Bonhoeffer, 
who shared many of their moral and religious convictions, judged 
differently than they did and offered reasons for their differing 
judgments. Though none of those individuals was ultimately 
persuaded to change his mind, they all in turn offered reasoned 
explanations for their choices and actions, which can be assessed as 
true or false, right or wrong, on the basis of shared moral 
commitments.127
By contrast, claims of belief liberty in general, and expressions 
of one’s sexual identity in particular, are grounded in the claimant 
herself. They refer to the claimant’s emotions, attractions, and most 
of all her “innermost concept of self” (as the Human Rights 
Campaign describes the source of gender identity).128 It is not a 
matter of fidelity to justice, or virtue, or natural law, or Divine Law, 
but rather a matter of authenticity. Only the self can evaluate such 
truths. They must remain inscrutable to anyone other than the self. 
And they certainly cannot be evaluated by anyone else as reasonable 
or unreasonable, much less true or false. The only possible arbiter of 
the truth of the sexual-identity claim is the individual claimant. So 
there arises a danger that reason might not be able to evaluate, 
mediate, or moderate a claim of sexual identity. 
Both sides think they are not just acting with integrity but are 
actually right. Both sides believe that they are right with references 
 126. VISCHER, CCG, supra note 4, at 45. 
 127. For example, King opened his classic statement on natural law and 
conscience by explaining why he was taking time to respond to those who criticized 
his civil disobedience: 
Seldom, if ever, do I pause to answer criticism of my work and ideas. If I 
sought to answer all the criticisms that cross my desk, my secretaries 
would be engaged in little else in the course of the day and I would have 
no time for constructive work. But since I feel that you are men of genuine 
goodwill and your criticisms are sincerely set forth, I would like to answer 
your statement in what I hope will be patient and reasonable terms. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter From a Birmingham Jail, NATURAL LAW, NATURAL 
RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 1 (last visited Oct. 28, 2016) 
http://www.nlnrac.org/american/american-civil-rights-movements/primary-source-
documents/letter-form-a-birmingham-jail.
 128. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, supra note 103. 
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to a binding source of obligation. And, at least in the case of sexual-
identity claimants, those binding obligations require others to 
participate in their acts of self-expression by which their identity is 
vindicated. This is not the sort of conflict that can be resolved easily. 
IV. ATTEMPTS AT MEDIATION: RIGHTS, RULES, AND MARKETS
The resources of liberalism and positivism have not proven 
themselves able to resolve the conflict. Rights discourse obscures 
more than it reveals largely because claimants tend not to distinguish 
different kinds of rights. Rules are either too determinate, 
unamenable to the requirements of reason, or indeterminate, 
requiring the exercise of judgment based on reasons other than rules. 
And market-based solutions have not fully accounted for the moral 
claims at stake. 
A. The Failure of Rights 
The vernacular of rights does not lend itself to tempering this 
conflict. And the particular rights asserted compound the problem. 
Not all disputants are equally interested in liberty and immunity. The 
assertion of claim-rights and powers by claimants in these disputes 
makes conflict unavoidable and difficult to resolve. 
Liberties and immunities are often referred to as “negative” 
rights, which means simply that they correlate with duties of 
abstention—duties specified as no-rights and disabilities, in 
Hohfeldian terms.129 Though enforced by claim-rights and powers in 
the event of breach, they require only inaction to obey. Duties of 
abstention are legal obligations to refrain from acting in certain ways 
(punching people in the face), or upon certain persons (using curse 
words around children), or for certain reasons (performing surgery in 
order to cause physical injury). 
Because one can honor one’s duties of abstention by not doing, 
these rights can be honored without causing conflict or harm. A 
liberty, immunity, or other negative right claim can be good against 
the world without altering anyone’s legal status, requiring anyone to 
do anything, or depriving anyone of any right or entitlement. If all 
rights were liberties and immunities, and all liberties and immunities 
were honored, then there would be no legal justification for coercing 
anyone to do anything. 
 129. See Hohfeld, supra note 12, at 65. 
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Conscience claimants in public accommodations cases 
generally assert liberties and immunities. The owners who do not 
want to lease to an unmarried, cohabitating couple, or photograph a 
same-sex wedding, or bake a cake bearing a political message that 
they find morally problematic, are asking for the right to be left 
alone, to not be acted upon, to not have their legal status altered. This 
seems not to be a coincidence. The fully determinate duties of 
conscience in natural law and religious traditions, known as moral 
absolutes, are duties of abstention.130 And those traditions teach that 
conscience has its strongest claim when it is trying to avoid being 
complicit in violating a moral absolute, an action that is intrinsically 
wrong.131
This is not to suggest that moral and religious duties do not also 
include duties of action. But given the limitations of time and other 
resources, the plurality and prioritization of human relationships and 
personal obligations, and other variables, duties of action are 
inherently indeterminate as two-term generalizations. In Thomist 
terms, they are often matters of determination;132 in the language of 
the jurists, they are matters of indifference.133 General, affirmative 
obligations can reasonably be specified as fully conclusive, three-
term duties in various ways. One possible specification might be 
more or less reasonable than an alternative. Or one might be 
determined by some other, prior obligation (my duty to feed my own 
children before feeding someone else’s). But none is absolutely 
determined as a universal, good-against-the-world duty of general 
application.134
 130. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES: TRADITION, REVISION, AND 
TRUTH 3 (1991). 
 131. Tollefsen, supra note 80, at 124-27. 
 132. AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW, supra note 41, at 78-79. 
 133. I BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *126. 
 134. John Finnis explains, 
Where these duties are negative duties of respect—duties not to 
intentionally damage or destroy persons in basic aspects of their 
flourishing—they can be unconditional and exceptionless: “absolute 
rights.” Where they are affirmative responsibilities to promote well-being, 
they must inevitably be conditional, relative, defeasible, and prioritized by 
rational criteria of responsibility such as parenthood, promise, inter-
dependence, compensation and restitution, and so forth. 
John Finnis, The Priority of Persons Revisited, supra note 81, at 53. And even after 
the specification of such a norm as a settled duty, the obligation can be contingent 
upon conditions beyond one’s control. 
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The duties arising out of sexual-identity claims are therefore 
unique. Sexual-identity claimants assert that others owe them 
conclusive, fully determined, affirmative duties of action because 
they hold a universal claim-right, good against the world, by virtue 
of their sexual identity. Those who seek a legal right to lease the 
apartment of their choice or obtain a cake from the bakery of their 
choice are asserting what are known in jurisprudence as powers and 
affirmative claim-rights. In Hohfeldian terms, an affirmative claim-
right or power is specified in a conclusive, three- or four-term jural 
relation requiring a person to do something or requiring a person to 
be placed under some legal disability.135 Claim-right: person A has a 
right that person B must perform action x. Power: person A has a 
right that court C shall compel person B to perform x or impose 
liability on B for failing to perform x. 
Affirmative claim-rights correlate with legal duties to do 
something. Powers to enforce claim-rights correlate with affirmative 
changes (called disabilities) in the legal statuses of those who do not 
act as the claim-rights require. An affirmative claim-right entails that 
some particular duty-bearer must satisfy the claim by taking the 
particular action specified. A power entails that the holder of the 
power can alter the legal status of another person, imposing upon 
that person a legal disability (such as the loss of a right not to 
provide service or a judgment of liability) and that adjudicatory 
authorities must give legal effect to that altered legal status. 
Thus, though sexual-identity activists use the term “liberty” 
(possibly for rhetorical and political purposes), it is clear that they 
are not satisfied with liberty but instead seek affirmative claim-rights 
against and powers over conscientious business owners. Sexual-
identity activists, in essence, want their claim-rights and powers to 
be good against the world, like a liberty. These are super-claim-right 
liberties.136 So, Feldblum has argued that the belief liberty of persons 
in same-sex relationships requires laws coercing owners of public 
accommodations to provide service to same-sex couples that makes 
the owners complicit in conduct that they view as “sin.”137
 135. See Hohfeld, supra note 12, at 65.  
 136. In one totalitarian-sounding proposal, a law professor recently argued 
that states have a constitutional duty to force conscientious objectors to provide 
wedding-related services to same-sex couples. See generally James M. Oleske, Jr., 
“State Inaction,” Equal Protection, and Religious Resistance to LGBT Rights, 87 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1 (2016). 
 137. Feldblum, supra note 82, at 61-62. 
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This also seems not to be a coincidence; it appears to be 
inherent in the nature of sexual-identity right claims. Sexual-identity 
claimants view their intimate expressions as moral goods, on par 
with the fundamental rights of natural marriage and biological 
parentage.138 And the fundamental rights of marriage and family 
entail public recognition and approbation. So, a privacy right—a 
liberty to be left alone—is insufficient. 
Feldblum argues that there is no neutral position with respect to 
the legal status of homosexual conduct between imposing legal 
disabilities upon those who engage in that conduct and requiring 
everyone to affirm the moral value of such conduct.139 It is not 
enough for the state simply not to punish acts of homosexual 
intimacy. To stop short of making same-sex intimacy the same in 
law as marital intimacy is to take sides on the underlying moral 
question, and it is not “the side that helps gay people.”140 So 
Feldblum argues that if same-sex intimacy is a good with the “same 
moral valence as heterosexual activity” then the right of same-sex 
intimacy is a right to receive the affirmation that lawmakers and 
courts have traditionally bestowed upon important “moral goods 
[such] as family and marriage.”141
What sort of right would that be, and what duties would it 
impose on others? In the public accommodations context, this 
Roman Catholic landlord must lease this apartment to that 
cohabitating couple; this evangelical Protestant photographer must 
take pictures of that same-sex wedding. And the corollary power 
asserted always entails an affirmative change in the duty-bearer’s 
legal status. If this landlord and this photographer do not perform the 
action specified, then they are duty-breakers and must be held liable, 
or perhaps even enjoined, by those who exercise judicial power. 
These rights make conflict unavoidable. Furthermore, the conflict 
travels with the claimant. If the claim-right is good against the world, 
like a liberty, then the claim-right bearer is vested with a power to 
 138. See generally MacLeod, Rights, Privileges, and the Future of Marriage 
Law, supra note 50. 
 139. She insists that “the government is necessarily taking a stance on the 
moral question every time it fails to affirmatively ensure that gay people can live 
openly, safely and honestly in society.” Feldblum, supra note 82, at 88. 
 140. Id. at 89. 
 141. Id. at 70. 
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abrogate anyone else’s liberty or immunity simply by asserting the 
claim.142
B. The Problems with Positive Law 
The difficulties discussed thus far seem intractable if the 
contours of rights and duties in public accommodations law are 
drawn by positive law—law enacted by legislative and regulatory 
authorities. Mutually inconsistent rights cannot be reconciled in 
generally applicable positive law without abolishing someone’s 
rights. There is a present danger that all group enterprises will 
become public accommodations, all law governing public 
accommodations will become positive law, and all adjudication of 
disputes concerning public accommodations will be adjudicated by 
commissions and administrative authorities.143
The reconciliation of conflicting rights is unlikely to be 
satisfactory for at least three additional reasons. First, the contours of 
liberty must be drawn afresh every time the sovereign lawmaker 
considers whether any particular liberty or claim-right is to be 
recognized. If that is the case, then liberty and rights are not actually 
liberty or rights, they are what Jeremy Bentham called concessions 
of privilege from the sovereign lawmaker.144 If law is only posited
law then the very tools for checking power are fashioned by the 
sovereign. From the perspective of such a sovereign, privileges are 
not laws; they impose on the sovereign no binding obligation. 
Second, if liberty is merely a function of positive law then it 
need not have any essential connection to practical reasonableness. 
 142. There is irony here. The gay rights movement got its start by organizing 
behind liberties of property and association, often in places that were held open as 
public accommodations. See, e.g., Gay Students Org. of the Univ. of N.H. v. 
Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 663 (1st Cir. 1974); One Eleven Wines & Liquors, Inc. v. 
Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 235 A.2d 12, 19 (N.J. 1967). John Inazu notes, 
“[P]rotections for gay social clubs and gay student groups . . . were vital to the early 
gay rights movement.” John D. Inazu, A Confident Pluralism, 88 S. CAL. L. REV.
587, 590 (2015). Sexual-identity activist and scholar Andrew Koppelman also seeks 
both “a regime in which it’s safe to be gay” and “one that’s safe for religious 
dissenters.” Koppelman, Purposes of Antidiscrimination, supra note 6, at 621. 
 143. E.g., Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc. v. Comm’n on 
Human Rights & Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352, 360 (Conn. 1987) (upholding 
commission’s ruling that boy scout troop is a public accommodation); Dale v. Boy 
Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1230 (N.J. 1999), rev’d, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 144. JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL (H. L. A. Hart ed., 1970)),
reprinted in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1, 16 (J.H. Burns ed.,
1970).
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Obedience to one’s conscience in matters of controversial moral 
issues and sexual ethics might seem just as arbitrary and unjustifiable 
as racial discrimination. In segregationist regimes, positive laws have 
often required racial segregation, even against the common law 
rights and duties of those who act within domains of private 
ordering. Today, by the same positivist logic that gave rise to slavery 
and racial segregation, the person seeking liberty to obey her 
conscience or to express her sexual identity might be required to 
carry the segregationist’s baggage if she cannot persuade those who 
do not share her moral convictions. 
Third, and equally problematic, posited public rules function as 
laws by establishing determinate reasons of general application. 
They are peremptory in a way that private rights, wrongs, and duties 
need not be. They are unyielding to reasons and considerations that 
might differ from case to case. They do not leave space for mediating 
conflicts between actors within the domains of private ordering. 
Instead, they turn all important questions into zero-sum contests and 
raise the stakes even higher. So, if public accommodations law is 
positive law then there seems little hope of mediating these conflicts 
reasonably and peacefully. 
Fortunately, the right claims asserted go well beyond the 
degree of determination found in positive law. Neither religious 
liberty rules nor nondiscrimination rules are fully conclusive, 
peremptory reasons, absolute in normative force for all purposes. 
Rather, they are reasons of particular weight that act categorically to 
allow into legal deliberations a limited category of countervailing 
reasons, often called compelling state interests (e.g., racial diversity 
in a law school), and to require that any action taken in furtherance 
of those interests be the least restrictive means of achieving or 
securing those interests. Or they forbid acting for a particular reason 
(e.g., marital status) while allowing the same action when undertaken 
on the basis of a different reason (that the couple is engaged in 
adultery). 
The legal standard known among lawyers as “strict scrutiny” is 
a device for excluding from deliberation most, but not all, categories 
of primary reasons. Similarly, posited rules governing religious 
liberty and equality rights are not absolute and peremptory but rather 
categorical exclusionary reasons for action. Both types of standards 
guide deliberation and judgment in meaningful, but not fully 
conclusive or determinate ways. 
The standard structure of strict scrutiny is incorporated in the 
federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
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(RLUIPA),145 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),146 state 
RFRAs,147 and similar laws.148 The burden of justification for state 
actions that place a substantial burden on religious exercise is shifted 
to the state actor.149 And the possible reasons that can justify the 
action are limited to ends that are compelling and means that are 
narrowly tailored.150 But countervailing reasons are not entirely 
preempted or excluded from consideration, as they would be if 
proffered against an absolute right.151
Nor does resolution of the legal issues alone determine the 
outcome of any dispute. Whether the claimant’s motivation was 
religious,152 what counts as a “substantial burden” on religious 
exercise,153 what counts as a “compelling interest” justifying that 
burden,154 and whether the state action that imposes the burden is the 
least restrictive means of achieving that interest,155 are all fact 
questions to be resolved in each case. 
 145. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a) (2012). 
 146. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (2012). 
 147. See the legal materials compiled in STATE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
RESTORATION ACTS: A COMPILATION OF ENACTED AND RECENTLY PROPOSED 
LEGISLATION (William H. Manz ed., 2016). 
 148. Compare ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01 (2016), with La., Exec. Order No. 
BJ 2015-8 (2015) (prohibiting outright any state actor from taking enumerated 
adverse actions against any person “on the basis that such person acts in accordance 
with his religious belief that marriage is or should be recognized as the union of one 
man and one woman”). 
 149. See Douglas Laycock, State RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 755, 784 (1999). 
 150. See Thomas C. Berg & Frank Myers, The Alabama Religious Freedom 
Amendment: An Interpretive Guide, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 47 (2000); Shelley Ross 
Saxer, Faith in Action: Religious Accessory Uses and Land Use Regulation, 2008 
UTAH L. REV. 593, 615-30 (2008). 
 151. See Laycock, supra note 149, at 784. 
 152. See State v. White, 271 P.3d 1217, 1221, 1226-27 (Idaho Ct. App. 2011). 
 153. See Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. FERC, 545 F.3d 1207, 1213-15 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (upholding federal agency’s factual finding that agency’s licensing 
decision did not substantially burden Indian tribe’s religious exercise); Cottonwood 
Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1227 (C.D. 
Cal. 2002); Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 612 F. Supp. 
2d 1163, 1172 (D. Colo. 2009) (allowing jury to determine substantiality of the 
burden on a RLUIPA claimant’s religious exercise); Reaching Hearts Int’l, Inc. v. 
Prince George’s Cty., 584 F. Supp. 2d 766, 785-87 (D. Md. 2008); Mintz v. Roman 
Catholic Bishop of Springfield, 424 F. Supp. 2d 309, 320 (D. Mass. 2006). 
 154. See Snell v. City of York, 564 F.3d 659, 666-68 (3d Cir. 2009); Att’y 
Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 241 (Mass. 1994). 
 155. See Murphy v. Zoning Comm’n, 148 F. Supp. 2d 173, 189-91 (D. Conn. 
2001). 
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The standards protecting religious liberty are even less 
normatively forceful in practice. Because RLUIPA and RFRAs treat 
religious actors better than similarly situated non-religious actors, 
some scholars and jurists have concluded that they create potential 
conflicts with the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.156 To avoid those conflicts, lower federal courts have 
invented creative ways to disregard the plain language of RLUIPA 
and RFRAs and, for this and other reasons, the statutes are routinely 
under-enforced.157
Like religious and conscience liberties, rights and duties of 
equality and nondiscrimination are under- or un-determined as legal 
norms.158 They do not forbid all discrimination, not even on the basis 
of race, and not even when performed by a state actor.159 Racial 
discrimination is constitutionally justified when used to reverse the 
legacy of previous discrimination by the same institution160 or to 
achieve diversity in an elite law school.161 Most other forms of 
discrimination are justifiable on the basis of far less compelling 
reasons. 
Equality is neither absolutely right nor universally good.162
Indeed, discrimination and inequality are often requirements of 
justice; if, as often happens, two possibilities or persons are 
relevantly different “then it would be arbitrary to treat them 
equally.”163 Discrimination is another word for judgment, and right 
 156. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 439 (1994); 
Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional, 
Period, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 2 (1998); Marci A. Hamilton, RLUIPA Is a Bridge 
Too Far: Inconvenience Is Not Discrimination, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 959, 960-61 
(2012); Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Judicial Review of Local Land Use Decisions: 
Lessons from RLUIPA, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 717, 724 (2008). 
 157. See Douglas Laycock & Luke W. Goodrich, RLUIPA: Necessary, 
Modest, and Under-Enforced, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1021, 1025 (2012); 
Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 
S.D. L. REV. 466, 468 (2010); Adam J. MacLeod, Resurrecting the Bogeyman: The 
Curious Forms of the Substantial Burden Test in RLUIPA, 40 REAL EST. L.J. 115, 
134-37 (2011). 
 158. See generally HART, CONCEPT, supra note 43, at 155-84; Finnis, 
Equality and Differences, supra note 48; Sherif Girgis, Equality and Moral Worth in 
Natural-Law Ethics and Beyond, 59 AM. J. JURIS. 143 (2014). 
 159. Finnis, Equality and Differences, supra note 48, at 20-21. 
 160. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1989). 
 161. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). 
 162. Girgis, Equality and Moral Worth, supra note 158, at 146-49. 
 163. Id. at 153. 
 Tempering Civil Rights Conflicts 675
judgment entails right discrimination. “[T]o act without 
discrimination” is to act “without good judgment, indiscriminately.”164
All norms governing action discriminate, including rights, 
duties, rules, and legal judgments. Nondiscrimination rules and 
judgments themselves discriminate—between those distinctions that 
are arbitrary and unjust, and those that rightly treat different things 
differently. Right judgment requires distinguishing and 
discriminating between things and actions that are relevantly 
different. Right judgment and valid laws will therefore treat as equal 
those things and actions that are equal with respect to the relevant 
first-order reasons that make them equal, and will distinguish and 
discriminate between things and actions where the relevant primary 
reasons for acting are not the same.165 Insofar as many laws and 
judgments are good and just, the distinctions and discriminations on 
which they rest are good and just;166 insofar as some laws and 
judgments are evil or unjustified, some discrimination is evil or 
unjust.167
So, the standards protecting equality are not fully determinate 
legal norms in the abstract; they specify no conclusive rights or 
duties as a matter of general law and universal application. The 
indeterminacy of these norms, even those codified in statutes, is well 
illustrated by the earlier generation of sexual-identity cases, 
discussed above. Whether an act of fornication or adultery is a 
reason in itself or rather is pretext for another’s unmarried status, and 
whether the conscientious landlord or employer acted for the reason 
of the conduct or the status, are questions that must be resolved 
before judgment is determined in a jural relation: A had a liberty not 
to x for B; A had a duty to x for B.168
 164. Finnis, Equality and Differences, supra note 48, at 27. 
 165. Girgis, Equality and Moral Worth, supra note 158, at 149-55. 
 166. Nathan Berkeley observes that “refusing to affirm sexual expressions 
and associated relational forms, or forms of gender identity that may reduce human 
maleness and femaleness to matters of individual autonomy, are not prima facie
offenses against human dignity and may be rooted in genuine religious convictions.” 
Nathan A. Berkeley, Religious Freedom and LGBT Rights: Trading Zero Sum 
Approaches for Careful Distinctions and Genuine Pluralism, 50 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 15 
(2015).
 167. Berkeley also affirms, “[b]oth individuals and institutions should affirm 
and respect the inherent dignity and infinite value of all persons. This is a matter that 
the state and the polity over which it governs can have only one view—a plurality of 
viewpoints is unacceptable here.” Id.
 168. By its specification of these norms, the jury thus cooperates with what 
Nathan Chapman calls courts’ “law-defining function” in constitutional 
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In nondiscrimination disputes, the actor’s actual motivation is a 
determinative fact question,169 which is within the province of the 
jury170 or other trier of fact.171 In mixed-motivation cases, whether 
any prohibited motivation was a proximate cause of the act of 
discrimination172 and whether there existed a legitimate, non-
prohibited reason for the action are also fact questions for a jury or 
other trier of fact.173 Whether the discriminatory motivation comes 
within the prohibited category of reasons involves questions of legal 
interpretation, which requires some specification of the legal 
standard.174
In nondiscrimination cases predicated upon public 
accommodation duties, additional fact questions must also be 
resolved by the jury, including whether the defendant’s enterprise is 
a public accommodation,175 and whether any exclusion was for a 
valid reason.176 A posited rule prohibiting discrimination on the basis 
of a specified reason thus remains undetermined as a legal norm until 
applied in the particular case. And the same case-by-case 
                                                                                                       
adjudication, which consists at the trial level of instructing the jury about the law 
and at the appellate level of reviewing the trial judge’s jury instructions and the 
jury’s verdict for consistency with the law. Nathan S. Chapman, The Jury’s 
Constitutional Judgment, 67 ALA. L. REV. 189, 235-36 (2015). Courts thus patrol the 
outer boundaries of norm specification to ensure that the jury does not stray beyond 
those first-order reasons that the law does determine. Id. 
 169. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000); 
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289-90 (1982). 
 170. Haddad v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (No. 1), 914 N.E.2d 59, 72 (Mass. 
2009).
 171. Viering v. Fla. Comm’n on Human Relations, 109 So. 3d 296, 298-99 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
 172. Boyd v. State, 349 P.3d 864, 873-74 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015). 
 173. Fell v. Spokane Transit Auth., 911 P.2d 1319, 1330-31 (Wash. 1996). 
 174. See, e.g., Mister v. A.R.K. P’ship, 553 N.E.2d 1152, 1156 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1990).
 175. See, e.g., Mena v. Lifemark Hosps. of Fla., Inc., 50 So. 3d 759, 761 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010); Eckerd Drug Co. v. Gordie, 14 Ohio Law Abs. 513, 513 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1933); Fell, 911 P.2d at 1329. 
 176. Compare Noble v. Higgins, 158 N.Y.S. 867, 867 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1916) 
(ordering judgment for defendant where undisputed evidence showed refusal to 
serve was “on purely personal grounds” and not because of race, creed, or color), 
with Tobias v. Riehm, 162 N.Y.S. 976, 978 (N.Y. App. Div. 1917) (holding that a 
trial judge improperly dismissed claim where evidence was sufficient to show 
discrimination because of race), and Beckett v. Pfaeffle, 157 N.Y.S. 247, 248 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1916) (finding no evidence of discrimination because of race; evidence 
showed that delay in service before which claimants left restaurant was due to 
waitress making tea). 
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specification is required whether the prohibited reason is marital 
status, sexual orientation, or any other specific reason. 
The conflict between right claims introduces an additional level 
of indeterminacy into the general law. For when indeterminate norms 
of religious liberty and indeterminate norms of equality conflict, one 
norm must give way.177 Consider the conflict between the ruling in 
Elane Photography and RLUIPA.178 The judgment of the New 
Mexico Human Rights Commission constituted an individualized 
assessment179 that imposed a substantial burden on the Huguenins’ 
religious exercise.180 Assuming arguendo that New Mexico has a 
compelling interest in ensuring the existence of public 
accommodations for same-sex weddings, even where state law 
defines marriage as the union of a man and a woman, surely that 
interest can be advanced by less restrictive means where other 
market actors are willing and able to perform. To suppose that the 
ruling in Elane Photography was determined by law would be to 
misunderstand the nature of the legal norms at play. 
 177. Consider by analogy the conflict between sexual-identity rights and free 
speech rights. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Bos., 
515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 178. See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013); 42 
U.S.C. § 2000cc(a) (2012). 
 179. A determination by a nondiscrimination commission is an 
“individualized assessment” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 2000cc(a)(2)C). And 
there is authority for reading the term “land use regulation” in (a)(2)(C) to include, 
but not be exhausted by, the examples “zoning or landmarking law, or the 
application of such a law,” within the definitional provision of 2000cc-5(5). Shelley 
Ross Saxer, Eminent Domain Actions Targeting First Amendment Land Uses, 69 
MO. L. REV. 653, 668-69 (2004). See also G. David Mathues, Note, Shadow of a 
Bulldozer?: RLUIPA and Eminent Domain After Kelo, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1653, 1664-66 (2006). It is a land use regulation because, like eminent domain, a 
discrimination judgment burdens the religious landowner as landowner. See
Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 
1203, 1232 (C.D. Cal. 2002). It is for the same reason unlike a marijuana ban, which 
is not a land use regulation, because a narcotics ban burdens the landowner in his 
capacity as marijuana smoker, not his capacity as property owner. Multi 
Denominational Ministry of Cannabis & Rastafari, Inc. v. Gonzales, 474 F. Supp. 2d 
1133, 1143 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
 180. Fuller discussions of these standards and their specifications by inferior 
federal tribunals can be found in Shelley Ross Saxer, Assessing RLUIPA’s 
Application to Building Codes and Aesthetic Land Use Regulation, 2 ALB. GOV’T L.
REV. 623 (2009). See also Adam J. MacLeod, A Non-Fatal Collision: Interpreting 
RLUIPA Where Religious Land Uses and Community Interests Meet, 42 URB. LAW.
41 (2010); Adam J. MacLeod, Resurrecting the Bogeyman, supra note 157.  
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C. Markets and Moral Marketplaces 
Given the stakes, lawyers do well who desire a neutral solution 
to the conflict between conscience and sexual identity. And some 
have proposed the marketplace as a possible neutral ground.181
Neutrality is achieved by prescinding from normative judgment. The 
Sisters of St. Joseph of Boston want to run a school that teaches their 
Catholic beliefs;182 Jonathan and Elaine Huguenin want to run their 
photography business without violating their belief in marriage as a 
man–woman union;183 the racist Maurice Bessinger wants to use his 
barbeque sauce to express his pro-slavery beliefs;184 the 
segregationist Lester Maddox wants to exclude African-Americans 
from his restaurant;185 and homosexual bakers want to operate their 
businesses without casting doubt on their support for same-sex 
marriage.186 The liberty of nuns, Christian business owners, and gay 
bakers carries the same weight as the liberty of the racist and the 
segregationist. Liberty for one, liberty for all. 
Thomas Sowell, for one, is quite explicit in tying together the 
liberty of the nuns, the evangelicals, the racist, and the 
segregationist. “If you say that Lester Maddox has to serve his 
chicken to blacks, you’re saying that the Boy Scouts have to have 
gay scout masters. You’re saying—ultimately—that the Catholic 
Church has to perform same-sex marriages.”187
 181. See, e.g., Epstein, Freedom of Association, supra note 3.  
 182. Milton J. Valencia, Gay Married Man Says Catholic School Rescinded 
Job Offer, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 30, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/ 
01/29/dorchester-man-files-discrimination-against-catholic-school-says-lost-job-because-
was-gay-married/0KswVITMsOrruEbhsOsOeN/story.html [https://perma.cc/ATQ8-
YDKM]. Not least is § 2000cc-3(g), requiring broad construction of RLUIPA’s 
terms in favor of religious landowners. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) (2012). 
 183. See Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 59; Client Story: Elane
Photography v. Willock, ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM, (last visited Oct. 28, 
2016), https://www.adflegal.org/detailspages/case-details/elane-photography-v.-willock. 
 184. See John Monk, Barbecue Eatery Owner, Segregationist Maurice 
Bessinger Dies at 83, THE STATE (Feb. 24, 2014, 8:59 AM), http://www.thestate. 
com/news/business/article13839323.html [https://perma.cc/L8AQ-MEML].  
 185. See Justin Nystrom, Lester Maddox (1915-2003), NEW GA.
ENCYCLOPEDIA (Aug. 16 2016), http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/ 
government-politics/lester-maddox-1915-2003 [https://perma.cc/5E3V-CTU3].  
 186. See Kirsten Andersen, This Evangelist Asked a Gay Bakery to Make a 
Traditional Marriage Cake. Now He May Face Charges., LIFE SITE NEWS (Apr. 9, 
2015, 4:59 PM), https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/this-evangelist-asked-a-gay-
bakery-to-make-a-traditional-marriage-cake.-now [https://perma.cc/93XA-A9KH].  
 187. Kyle Peterson, The March of Foolish Things, WALL ST. J. (September 4, 
2015, 5:56 PM) (quoting Thomas Sowell), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-march-
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The suggestion is that law should stay out of these matters. We 
need not concern our legal and political institutions with the 
(im)morality of actors in the marketplace because, Richard Epstein 
argues, “[I]f competitive market forces are allowed to work, the 
problem of discrimination will be solved by the entry of new firms 
who will cater to mass markets, wholly without legal compulsion.”188
The nondiscrimination norm should attach only to “areas of 
monopoly power,”189 such as common carriers, public utilities, 
governments, and markets that are de facto monopolies, such as the 
Jim Crow South in the 1960s.190 Otherwise, according to the 
marketplace proposal, discrimination of all sorts should be permitted. 
Epstein’s proposal is grounded in a sophisticated understanding 
of the role that free association and cooperation play in human 
flourishing. Freedom of association is to be preferred over coercion, 
he argues, because unlike legal coercion, “voluntary cooperation is 
never a zero-sum game, but always operates in expectation as a 
positive-sum game for its participants.”191 Epstein might be heard to 
echo the insights of natural law philosophers, who observe that a 
shared or common good is good not just for each but for all, and its 
value to each is enhanced precisely because, and insofar as, it is 
shared by others.192 Cooperation among members of an association or 
group for a common good enables both or all members of the group 
to participate in and realize goods that are not possible in isolation 
and are not reducible to the goods of each individual member or any 
aggregation of them. Those goods are realized in intermediary and 
associational institutions, including economic and market actors, 
behind the protection of economic and associational liberties.193 And 
the goods are shared not only by insiders within the group or 
association but also often in some degree by outsiders.194
Because many of those goods are reflexive in nature, and 
because they require cooperation for their realization, legal coercion 
                                                                                                       
of-foolish-things-1441407396 [https://perma.cc/3MCP-AW3V]. See also Epstein, 
Freedom of Association, supra note 3.  
 188. Epstein, The Problem With Antidiscrimination Laws, supra note 3.  
 189. Epstein, Freedom of Association, supra note 3. 
 190. Epstein, The Problem With Antidiscrimination Laws, supra note 3. 
 191. Epstein, Freedom of Association, supra note 3. 
 192. John Finnis, for example, explains that when A and B cooperate in a 
shared good, such as friendship, then “what A wants for himself he wants (at least in 
part) under the description ‘that-which-B-wants-for-himself’, and vice versa.” 
FINNIS, NLNR, supra note 18, at 141. 
 193. Epstein, Freedom of Association, supra note 3. 
 194. Id.
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destroys both the economic and the moral value of those plural 
practices and institutions of private ordering.195 Yet Epstein wants to 
count these goods on a single scale of commensuration, and that 
scale is economic. So, there remains a concern that Epstein’s 
economic account does not encompass all the goods and 
requirements of practical reasonableness. Andrew Koppelman agrees 
with Epstein that freedom of association should be the default 
position and that any departure from that norm bears the “burden of 
proof.”196 But not all of the goals of law are economic, and 
nondiscrimination law serves a deeper purpose. “It helps reshape 
culture in order to eliminate patterns of stigma and prejudice that 
constitute some classes of persons as inferior members of society.”197
Similarly, Marc Degirolami doubts that neutrality is possible 
between competing conceptions of justice and the good. “Law gives 
direction; it teaches, orders, and ranks; it creates hierarchies. The 
classical liberal model of law is no exception.”198 Epstein’s economic 
reductionism puts us on “uncomfortable footing.”199 Not all 
associations derive from contract200 and the classical liberal model 
that Epstein champions privileges some associations and values over 
others. A “conception of associations, in which friendship, loyalty, 
 195. Compare MACLEOD, P&PR, supra note 14, at 91-145, with Epstein, 
Freedom of Association, supra note 3. 
 196. Andrew Koppelman, Richard Epstein’s Imperfect Understanding of 
Antidiscrimination Law, LIBR. OF L. & LIBERTY (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www. 
libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/richard-epsteins-imperfect-understanding-of-
antidiscrimination-law/ [https://perma.cc/UA8U-CKYE].  
 197. Id.
 198. Marc Degirolami, Classical Liberalism: Teaching Its Own Undoing,
LIBR. OF L. & LIBERTY (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-
forum/classical-liberalism-teaching-its-own-undoing/ [https://perma.cc/NV7N-5FBB]. 
 199. Id.
 200. Degirolami argues, 
Association may be a subset of contract in certain utilitarian arrangements 
of the economic market and the business world. But many kinds of 
association are not obviously derived from contract. Indeed, they are not 
contractual at all. The associations of friendship, romantic love, family, 
religious community, and even conversation come to mind. Sometimes, 
associational structures like these can result in contractual arrangements 
(suggesting that the latter might be “a subset” of the former), while at 
other times there is no natural connection between association and 
contract. The highest form of friendship in Aristotle’s account is an 
association in which each member “loves the other for what he is” and 
which endures “so long as they remain good.” 
Id.
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devotion, and even love, all take a back seat to market-driven choice-
making,” results in “active disrespect for all existing truths.”201
Leaving aside for present purposes which conceptions of sexual 
identity, conscience, and liberty are among those existing truths, it 
seems uncontroversial to observe that nondiscrimination on the basis 
of race is prominent among them. Allowing racial discrimination in 
public accommodations causes real harm not only to the person 
discriminated against, but also to the people and institutions who 
discriminate on racial grounds, and that harm is as just and proper a 
subject of concern for law as harm to others.202 A person or group 
that refuses to cooperate with others on the basis of racial differences 
constitutes himself, herself, or itself as a racist person or group. As 
Martin Luther King Jr. observed, “[S]egregation distorts the soul and 
damages the personality. It gives the segregator a false sense of 
superiority and the segregated a false sense of inferiority.”203 The 
duty not to allow racial difference to motivate one’s choices and 
actions is a duty that one owes to those who are different and to 
oneself.
Others have proposed market solutions or classical liberal 
norms supplemented by more robust roles for the mediating 
institutions of civil society—all those groups, associations, and 
communities that sit between the individual and the state. Ryan 
Anderson,204 Nathan Berkeley,205 Sherif Girgis,206 Andrew 
Koppelman,207 and John Inazu208 are among those who call for 
pluralistic resolutions. The objective is a solution that differentiates 
between different institutions and intentions. The nuns and the 
 201. Id.
 202. See GEORGE, supra note 87. 
 203. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter From a Birmingham Jail (1963), 
http://www.nlnrac.org/american/american-civil-rights-movements/primary-source-
documents/letter-form-a-birmingham-jail [https://perma.cc/F78C-8F8Z].  
 204. See ANDERSON, supra note 67. 
 205. See Berkeley, supra note 166, at 15 (arguing that “refusing to affirm 
sexual expressions and associated relational forms, or forms of gender identity that 
may reduce human maleness and femaleness to matters of individual autonomy, are 
not prima facie offenses against human dignity and may be rooted in genuine 
religious convictions”). “Both individuals and institutions should affirm and respect 
the inherent dignity and infinite value of all persons. This is a matter that the state 
and the polity over which it governs can have only one view—a plurality of 
viewpoints is unacceptable here.” Id.
 206. See Girgis, Nervous Victors, supra note 113, at 400. 
 207. See Koppelman, Purposes of Antidiscrimination, supra note 6, at 655.  
 208. See generally Inazu, supra note 142. 
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evangelicals would be insulated from the scrutiny of law within their 
domains of liberty, but not Maurice Bessinger or Lester Maddox. 
As Andrew Koppelman frames the matter, there is a difference 
between religious ideas that are false and those religious ideas that 
are “not only false, but also destructive.”209 Koppelman thinks 
natural-marriage advocates are “obviously wrong,” and natural-
marriage advocates think the same of Koppelman.210 He observes that 
“each side’s most basic beliefs entail that the other group is in error 
about moral fundamentals and that the other’s entire way of life, 
predicated on that error, ought not to exist.”211 The solution is mutual 
toleration. Unless destructive, both sides in the identity-versus-
conscience conflicts should be at liberty to “seek space in society 
wherein they can live out their beliefs, values, and identities.”212 To 
avoid dignitarian harms, Koppelman proposes, among other things, 
that religious businesses be accommodated with exemptions from 
some nondiscrimination norms if they “announce their religious 
concerns in advance.”213
One impressive effort that has quickly become a landmark in 
this genre is the proposal advanced by Robert Vischer. In his book, 
Conscience and the Common Good,214 Vischer champions a robust, 
but not impervious, “moral marketplace”215 sitting between 
individual and state, in which different groups and institutions are 
free to constitute themselves around plural moral values. 
Vischer contends that American law has tended to elevate 
individual conscience at the expense of “the communal venues 
through which the full flourishing of conscience is most likely to 
occur.”216 Vischer thinks we should “break conscience out of the 
individual-versus-state paradigm.”217 Conscience cannot flourish if it 
is coerced by the state. But in order to flourish, conscience also 
needs to be formed, articulated, and implemented, and this is done 
within relationships, communities, associations, and traditions.218
 209. See Koppelman, Purposes of Antidiscrimination, supra note 6, at 626. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id.
 212. Id.
 213. Id. at 628, 646-49. 
 214. VISCHER, CCG, supra note 4.  
 215. Id. at 4. 
 216. Id. at 36. 
 217. Id. at 43. 
 218. Id. at 44. 
 Tempering Civil Rights Conflicts 683
This pluralism of our conscience-formation should be reflected 
in our laws. Vischer argues the following: 
If our concern for conscience prompts (as it should) concern for the 
formative power of religious tradition and religious community, we also 
must take care not to obstruct the points of entry into those traditions and 
communities, whether entry is motivated by eternal or more pedestrian 
considerations, like curiosity.219
On this basis, Vischer lays out “the contours of a marketplace 
in which moral convictions are allowed to operate and compete 
without invoking the trump of state power.”220 Because conscience is 
formed in communities, associations, and families that sit between 
the individual and the state, liberty of conscience requires an 
associational and institutional pluralism—a vigorous civil society, 
which will allow “the commercial sphere to reflect our moral 
pluralism.”221
Generally, Vischer argues that coercion should be discouraged, 
even when exercised on behalf of individuals (whose rights claims 
might damage the associational freedom of intermediary groups), 
and the role of state power should be limited to ensuring a 
functioning market by ensuring access.222 Where state power is 
needed to correct a market failure, coercion may be used to thwart 
the self-constitution of conscientious persons and groups that causes 
discrimination.223 But coercion should not be used unless certain 
criteria are established, one of which is that the claimed exercise of 
conscience is “incompatible with securing goods that are 
foundational to participation in our society.”224 This criterion would 
support nondiscrimination laws governing the market for housing, 
but not for more fungible goods. 
Access is one of the goods that segregated markets denied to 
black Americans during Jim Crow, and Vischer thinks that the civil 
rights statutes of the middle twentieth century, especially the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, were justified responses to market failures.225
Because the markets were broken, they functioned like 
monopolies.226 It follows that the same rules that prohibited racial 
 219. Id. at 39. 
 220. Id. at 5. 
 221. Id.
 222. Id. at 28. 
 223. Id. at 29-30, 171-76. 
 224. Id. at 28. 
 225. Id. at 29. 
 226. Id. at 29-30. 
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discrimination by common carriers and public utilities were 
justifiably extended to those segregated markets that exhibited 
monopolistic behaviors,227 notwithstanding that the civil rights 
legislation overrode the associational freedoms of those who 
defended segregation.228
The attractions of Vischer’s proposal are manifest.229 But some 
might reasonably worry that market-based models might not perform 
the work desired of them. If constructed as a legally and morally 
neutral venue of associational freedom, unmediated by the basic 
requirements of justice, then a moral marketplace might in practice
preserve space for associations and practices that practice unjust 
actions and constitute what Vischer calls “their own distinct—even 
deviant—moral identities.”230 (Vischer accepts this possibility.) 
On the other hand, a moral marketplace might leave no room in 
principle for liberty of conscience. Vischer wants to place legal 
limits on liberty in the marketplace to the extent of prohibiting racial 
discrimination by the “aggressive”231 means of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act. Yet once he has made that concession, friends of religious 
freedom might reasonably worry, and proponents of sexual-identity 
right claims might reasonably hope, that he has introduced a 
principle that undermines the pluralism of moral marketplaces. Many 
view insistence on traditional sexual ethics as tantamount to bigotry, 
indistinguishable from racism for all public purposes. Those same 
activists argue that the same dignitary harms to racial minorities that 
justified coercive civil rights laws now justify coercive sexual ethics 
laws to protect sexual minorities.232 Epstein’s and Vischer’s 
arguments that sexual-identity claimants do not suffer the same 
 227. See Epstein, The Problem With Antidiscrimination Laws, supra note 3.  
 228. See VISCHER, CCG, supra note 4, at 26-27. 
 229. Michael Moreland observes that Vischer’s model of a moral 
marketplace makes “a powerful rejoinder to a certain Hobbesian picture of 
sovereignty.” Moreland, supra note 124, at 324. 
 230. VISCHER, CCG, supra note 4, at 115. This causes one of Vischer’s 
readers to wonder if Vischer has ignored or elided the associational uniqueness of 
the Church in forming conscience. See Patrick McKinley Brennan, Conscience and 
the Common Good: An Alternative Perspective, 49 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 307, 310 
(2010). Brennan states, “In the eyes of Catholic social doctrine, ‘deviant’ 
associations—if by deviant we mean associations whose aims and/or practices 
violate the moral law—do not have rights against legitimate ‘centralized 
authority,’ though it may of course sometimes be prudent for that ruling authority to 
let them alone.” Id. at 313. 
 231. VISCHER, CCG, supra note 4, at 29. 
 232. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 110, at 2574-75. 
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material harms as African-Americans during Jim Crow do not 
respond to the arguments raising subjective belief liberty and 
dignitary harm. 
If the state has a sufficient interest to intrude into the private 
sphere to eliminate racial discrimination then it seems that it also has 
a sufficient interest to breach that sphere to prevent discrimination on 
the basis of sexual identity and the nature of marriage. Intrusion 
might seem particularly justifiable where it is undertaken to correct a 
market failure.233 But even without evidence of a market failure, 
sexual identity claims might demand action if dignitary harm is a 
basis for legal coercion, as some now claim.234 This might lead to 
what one reader has called “a slow-motion descent into a widespread 
use of state coercion that [Vischer himself] says will undermine the 
common good and make it impossible for moral communities to live 
out their share[d] convictions in the marketplace.”235
Is there a way to preserve the integrity of the marketplace both 
as a neutral venue for pluralism and as a morally bounded venue for 
justice? On one hand, leaving these disputes entirely to market actors 
leaves real, fundamental rights and duties unvindicated. On the other 
hand, entrusting to Leviathan the power to regulate the moral 
boundaries of liberty without resort to practical reasonableness and 
fundamental law, even only to the extent of correcting what 
Leviathan determines are market failures, leaves liberty at the mercy 
of Leviathan’s will. 
 233. See Nora O’Callaghan, Death by a Thousand Cuts: Why Market 
Mechanisms Won’t Solve the Culture Wars, 49 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 335, 337-39 
(2010).
 234. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 110, at 2575. 
 235. O’Callaghan, supra note 233, at 339. 
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V. A PERFECTIONIST APPROACH: THE MEDIATED DOMINIONS OF 
COMMON LAW
A. Mediated Dominion: Liberty and Morality Mediated by Common 
Law Institutions 
Fortunately, our civil rights derive from more textured and 
plural legal sources than Leviathan’s will. These include the law of 
the license, discrimination and equality norms in public 
accommodations doctrine, contracts for services, and the verdicts of 
civil juries. The common law sources of civil rights, of which posited 
rules are a part, when taken as a whole, are far more capable of 
resolving the present conflicts peacefully and reasonably than are 
statutes mandating one-size-fits-all religious liberty or 
nondiscrimination. These doctrines rule out truly unjust acts of 
discrimination, such as racial discrimination, while nevertheless 
mediating the boundaries of the owner’s right to exclude and the 
customer’s license in pluralistic fashion, on a case-by-case basis, 
according to the reason for creation of the license. 
To see how this works, it is useful to back up and put public 
accommodation rights in their common law civil rights context. The 
common law governing property generally, and public 
accommodations specifically, does not operate by imposing uniform 
rules on a whole population. Instead it arises from the practical 
judgment of customary institutions—the bailment, the tenancy, the 
license, the civil jury236—and consists of flexible but meaningful 
norms—liberties, wrongs, duties, claim-rights, privileges, 
immunities, and the boundaries provided by right reason237—to
mediate potential conflicts within public accommodations on private 
property. Working together, these institutions and norms secure 
liberties, create presumptions and burdens of justification, and limit 
the categories of justifications that may be offered for or against an 
action.238
By these means, the common law allows mediation between 
competing assertions of rights consistent with the requirements of 
religious conscience, identity, and justice generally. Only where a 
particular justification—e.g., the race of the licensee or the religious 
 236. See generally THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, THE OXFORD 
INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: PROPERTY (Dennis Patterson ed., 2010). 
 237. See MACLEOD, P&PR, supra note 14, at 197-215. 
 238. Id. at 190. 
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character of the licensor—is per se not a valid reason for excluding 
or requiring inclusion, given the purposes for the creation of the 
bailment, tenancy, or license, does the common law impose a 
general, uniform, and absolute rule. So, to think of public 
accommodation rules in strictly positivist terms as conclusive rules is 
to miss most of the complexity, pluralism, and context-dependency 
of public accommodations law in our common law tradition. 
Not only racial and ethnic differences, but also differences of 
moral identity—differences concerning the ends and means to which 
individuals and groups have committed themselves and around 
which they have thereby constituted their plans of action and their 
identities—are sure to become more prominent in the coming years 
and will play a more significant role in the specification of 
communities’ exclusionary reasons for action. If these groups and 
communities cannot agree with each other in the selection and 
specification of exclusionary reasons, then they will increasingly 
require autonomous domains within which they can commit to 
exclusionary reasons that others do not value and would even reject. 
On the other hand, we will still need moral norms to guide our 
choices and actions. And at least some of these norms will find their 
way into law as they are called upon to mediate conflicts between 
those in competing domains who have different convictions and who 
make conflicting rights claims. In other words, perfectionist 
pluralism should become more highly valued, particularly the 
pluralism that results from private law norms and institutions.239
The solution has long existed in our laws and legal institutions, 
though it laid largely dormant during the positivist and realist eras. 
The domains of common law private property ownership have the 
potential to rehabilitate pluralism.240 The decentralizing effects of 
private ownership are, of course, well understood and, because local 
and private authority can be abused just as government power can, 
those effects are viewed in some corners as inimical to liberty. Yet 
apples should be compared to apples. To compare focal exercises of 
government power with defective exercises of local and private 
authority amounts to special pleading. Focal cases of plural 
authorities should first be examined. And well-functioning instances 
of property norms conduce to freedom far more than central cases of 
public-law rules, regulatory norms, and two-term individual rights. 
 239. See Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 1409, 1421-46 (2012). 
 240. See id. at 1442-44. 
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The proposal offered here is perfectionist in that it is an 
account in which the good precedes the right.241 It is pluralist in that 
it is non-paternalistic, except where conclusive moral requirements 
demand legal determination and coercion.242
Common law domains of property (like private law generally 
in the common law) are perfectionist in the sense that they rule out 
those potential first-order reasons for action that are deemed wrong 
and direct those that are deemed right.243 The resulting norms are 
what the perfectionist liberal Joseph Raz has called exclusionary 
reasons for action.244 Exclusionary reasons are those second-order 
reasons that direct practical choice and action by excluding from 
deliberation, judgment, and choice possible first-order reasons for 
action. The norms of private property law—rights, wrongs, duties—
exclude from future deliberation potential first-order reasons for 
action. They impose obligations. 
Those obligations are seldom completely and conclusively 
determined before judgment. The full determination and 
specification of private law norms requires and entails judgment. 
Except for a few absolute duties—such as the duties not to maim and 
enslave—most private law norms are not fully determinate in the 
abstract. Rather, they are fully settled and specified as complete jural 
relations in particular judgments in particular cases.245 So unlike 
public law, which must be uniform, universal, and general in its 
application,246 private law and private ordering can mark the moral 
boundaries of free choice and action in particular cases according to 
the circumstances and the requirements of reason in each case, 
 241. Perfectionist accounts of law say that rights cannot be settled and 
specified without a prior statement of what is good and bad, right and wrong, to do 
or not do. See, e.g., RAZ, MOF, supra note 87; GEORGE, supra note 87.  
 242. In the words of Bradley Miller, “Typically, [the non-paternalistic 
perfectionists] hold that there is a range of morally valuable choices and a range of 
morally valueless choices, and an individual’s autonomy is not threatened but 
advanced by state action that rightly identifies, discourages, and (in a limited class 
of cases) prohibits the morally valueless.” Bradley W. Miller, Proportionality’s
Blind Spot: “Neutrality” and Political Philosophy, in PROPORTIONALITY AND THE 
RULE OF LAW: RIGHTS, JUSTIFICATION, REASONING 391 (Grant Huscroft, Bradley W. 
Miller, & Grégoire Webber eds., 2014). 
 243. See I BLACKSTONE, supra note 16 and accompanying text.  
 244. RAZ, MOF, supra note 87 at 165-92; RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND 
NORMS, supra note 15 at 35-48, 73-89; RAZ, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 15, 
at 128-43. 
 245. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Inner Morality of Private Law, 58 AM.
J. JURIS. 27, 42 (2013). 
 246. See generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964). 
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without imposing zero-sum or one-size-fits-all solutions on all 
cases.247
Mediated dominion is a way to describe the common law’s way 
of specifying property rights and duties consistent with basic moral 
values and requirements, the plurality of basic reasons and the basic 
requirements of practical reasonableness.248 Apart from a few 
absolute norms ruling out never-reasonable conduct (slavery, racial 
segregation), the institutions and norms of property in the common 
law tradition respond to the moral needs of human beings not with 
one-size-fits-all rules of general application but rather with plural 
forms and reasons, which are not products of positive enactments, 
but rather have grown organically from maxims, customs, and 
institutions that are foundational within our law. So, unlike positive 
rules, which emanate from a sovereign lawmaker and govern all 
individual subjects alike, mediated dominion within common law is 
not unitary and peremptory but rather pluralistic and categorical.249
B. Nondiscrimination in Common Law 
Viewed as a posited rule, public accommodations doctrine 
might appear to impose a one-size-fits-all solution to all questions of 
access. But in fact the statutes codify only one small set of the duties 
that mark the contours of the public accommodation license rights. 
Understood in its common law dimensions, the license is a limited 
right, marked out at its boundaries by the rationality of the owner’s 
reasons for action. Common law rights of equal access do not vest in 
their holders an absolute right to enter others’ private property, even 
private property held open as public accommodation.250 Rather, they 
require that any license extended to visitors of a public 
accommodation be extended on equal terms to all, without regard to 
arbitrary considerations (race, for example).251
Unfortunately, many public law officials act as if public 
accommodations consists of closed sets of positive rules. And state 
and federal judiciaries have sometimes endorsed that view. For 
example, a positivist conception of public accommodations law has 
 247. See Zipursky, supra note 245, at 31-33; Dagan, supra note 239, at 1411; 
Adam J. MacLeod, Strategic and Tactical Totalization in the Totalitarian Epoch, 5 
BR. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 57, 74 (2016) [hereinafter Totalization]. 
 248. See generally MACLEOD, P&PR, supra note 14.  
 249. Id.
 250. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 236, at 65-66.  
 251. Id. at 79-80.  
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clouded the United States Supreme Court’s public accommodations 
jurisprudence since the landmark case Bell v. Maryland.252 Bell et al. 
had staged a sit-in at a segregated restaurant.253 Convictions for 
criminal trespass against them were punished by fines of $10 each, 
and these sentences were suspended.254 After the convictions were 
affirmed by the Maryland courts and before the United States 
Supreme Court ruled, Maryland enacted a statute prohibiting racial 
discrimination in public accommodations.255
The U.S. Supreme Court then remanded for the Maryland 
Supreme Court to consider whether the new statutes required 
reversal of the convictions under Maryland state law.256 Writing for a 
plurality, Justice Brennan speculated that state law grounds would be 
sufficient to reverse.257 He reasoned, “A legislature that passed a 
public accommodations law making it unlawful to deny service on 
account of race probably did not desire that persons should still be 
prosecuted and punished for the ‘crime’ of seeking service from a 
place of public accommodations which denies it on account of 
race.”258
On remand, the Maryland high court found itself bound by 
Justice Brennan’s logic to conclude “that the passage of the public 
accommodations law by the Maryland Legislature brought about a 
fundamental change in the State trespass act.”259 The new public 
accommodations statute and the trespass prohibition “cannot stand 
together and both be executed, and to that extent, the two are 
repugnant and in irreconcilable conflict.”260 (The Maryland high 
court nevertheless affirmed the convictions on the ground that the 
legislature did not expressly extinguish existing criminal liabilities 
incurred before enactment of the new public accommodations 
statute.)261
In fact, the “fundamental change” in Maryland law was an 
illusion, as Justices Douglas and Goldberg, writing separately, 
 252. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964) [hereinafter Bell II].
 253. Id. at 227. 
 254. Bell v. State, 176 A.2d 771, 771 (Md. 1962) [hereinafter Bell I]. 
 255. Bell II, 378 U.S. at 228. 
 256. Id. at 242. 
 257. Id. at 232-35. 
 258. Id. at 235. 
 259. Bell v. State, 204 A.2d 54, 58 (Md. 1964) [hereinafter Bell III]. 
 260. Id.
 261. Id. at 61. 
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recognized.262 Properly understood, the proprietor had no property 
right to refuse to serve the protesters because of their race, before or 
after passage of the statute.263 Though he had no general duty to 
serve, he had no power to terminate their license on account of race. 
So, the patron who remains on the premises in compliance with the 
owner’s reasonable rules and regulations264 and who is denied service 
on the basis of race has been deprived of a property right.265
The property right belonged to the customers not because 
positive law said so but because the proprietor had carved out of his 
estate a license for paying customers and the common law license 
enjoyed by a customer in a public accommodation cannot be 
terminated on the basis of the customer’s race. A license to enter a 
public accommodation can be terminated by the owner for any valid 
reason, but only for a valid reason. Because it is not relevant to the 
purpose for which the business is conducted, race is not relevant to 
the reason for the license. And the scope of the license is determined 
by the reasons for which it is created. 
This is why Justice Douglas noted in his Bell concurrence that 
segregation “is barred by the common law as respects innkeepers and 
common carriers.”266 Civil remedies for violation of the bar against 
racial discrimination “were made by judges who had no written 
constitution.”267 The unwritten common law constitution of British 
North America held racial segregation, slavery, and other forms of 
racial discrimination contrary to reason, and therefore contrary to 
law. Justice Douglas could discern no reason to read the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which contains a written guarantee of equal protection, 
to leave restaurateurs free to discriminate on grounds that are 
forbidden to common carriers at common law.268
In his separate concurrence, Justice Goldberg went further. The 
fundamental right at stake was itself a common law liberty, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to secure “the rights and 
guarantees of the good old common law.”269 The common law duty 
to provide service on equal terms is expressed as a duty upon 
 262. Bell II, 378 U.S. at 254 (Douglas, J., concurring); Id. at 293-94 
(Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 263. See Donnell v. State, 48 Miss. 661, 682 (1873). 
 264. See Shepard v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 6 Wis. 539, 547 (1858). 
 265. Coger v. Nw. Union Packet Co., 37 Iowa 145, 157 (1873). 
 266. Bell II, 378 U.S. at 254 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 267. Id.
 268. Id. at 255.  
 269. Id. at 293-94 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted). 
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common carriers but is not limited to them. The correlative right is a 
natural right to travel freely, embodied in our common law heritage, 
which encompasses “the right of the citizen to be accepted and to be 
treated equally in places of public accommodation”270 generally. 
Thus, “at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of 
equal protection, was the assumption that the State by statute or by 
‘the good old common law’ was obligated to guarantee all citizens 
access to places of public accommodation. This obligation was 
firmly rooted in ancient Anglo-American tradition.”271
VI. MEDIATED DOMINION IN PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
Applying the general lessons of mediated dominion to public 
accommodations disputes specifically suggests a way forward. 
Pluralism is possible. So is justice. Common law norms and 
institutions can incorporate both. 
A. Public Accommodation as License 
The understanding of property law that Justice Goldberg 
expressed in his Bell concurrence has room for both liberty and just 
nondiscrimination norms. A marketplace governed by a robust 
common law conception of law, rather than merely positive rules, 
takes in both justice and liberty. Our fundamental laws incorporate 
the pluralism of the common law norms and institutions because the 
rights and duties of mediated dominion are foundational to the law 
that we inherited from England, which became the fundamental, 
organic law of the original colonies.272 Those laws are at odds with 
neither liberty nor nondiscrimination rules, and a marketplace 
governed by law rather than rules need not be devoid of morals or 
liberty.
In the marketplace, the common law norms and institutions of 
property and contract can mediate between potentially conflicting 
interests. For starters, common law licenses settle and specify the 
respective rights and duties of the parties not once and for all 
according to a uniform rule, but in each case according to the parties’ 
reasons for action and the requirements of reason. 
 270. Id. at 293 n.10. 
 271. Id. at 296-97. 
 272. See STONER, supra note 10, at 55, 58-59. 
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The license of a customer to enter a public accommodation 
does not originate in nondiscrimination statutes or other positive 
enactments of governments. It is a private law device, shaped and 
specified by institutions of private ordering. Because the norms are 
not promulgated in the first instance by positive lawmakers, the 
public’s license to enter a public accommodation is derived neither 
from the sovereignty of the state, nor from the constitutional 
guarantees of equal protection, but from the property owner’s 
authority to include and exclude.273 As the U.S. Supreme Court 
explained in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, a licensee’s license 
is a legal privilege carved out of the owner’s dominion by the 
owner’s consent, given when the owner opened his private property 
to some person, group, or the public at large.274 The licensor’s right 
to determine the scope of the license is the right that that secular 
universities, such as University of California at Hastings and 
Vanderbilt University, use to exclude student groups who adhere to 
traditional, theistic moral teachings and thus to constitute themselves 
as institutions committed to the principles of left liberalism.275 It is 
the same right that religious colleges, such as Gordon College, use to 
constitute themselves according to religious beliefs.276 Private 
property makes pluralism possible.277
The licensor determines the scope of the license by determining 
the purposes for which entry will be permitted.278 Yet once the 
purposes of the license are established, the owner’s authority to 
exclude becomes bounded by those purposes.279 Whereas the owner 
of a private residence can exclude anyone for any reason or no 
reason, a property owner who opens his land to the public, say as a 
barbershop,280 may exclude only for good reasons related to operation 
 273. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 678-79 (2010). 
 274. Id.
 275. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Vanderbilt’s Right to Despise Christianity,
PUB. DISCOURSE (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/03/4930/
[https://perma.cc/45PZ-6HQJ]. 
 276. See Adam J. MacLeod, Gordon College and Pluralism in Higher 
Education, PUB. DISCOURSE (July 30, 2014), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/ 
2014/07/13600/ [https://perma.cc/HAC3-XN5S]. 
 277. Compare Dagan, supra note 239, with Adam J. MacLeod, Universities 
as Constitutional Lawmakers (And Other Hidden Actors in Our Constitutional 
Orders), 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE 1, 13-15 (2014). 
 278. See State v. Steele, 11 S.E. 478, 483-84 (N.C. 1890). 
 279. See Adam Mossoff, The False Promise of the Right to Exclude, 8 ECON.
J. WATCH 255, 260 (2011). 
 280. See, e.g., State v. Sprague, 200 A.2d 206, 208 (N.H. 1964). 
694 Michigan State Law Review  2016 
of a barbershop. So, what Justice Goldberg called the “good old 
common law” has long prohibited racial discrimination in public 
accommodations where race is irrelevant to the purpose for which 
the property is held open to the public (i.e., almost always). 
Blackstone gave us the paradigmatic account of the doctrine. 
He explained that opening one’s doors as a public accommodation 
vests in the public a license to enter. “[A] man may justify entering 
into an inn or public house, without the leave of the owner first 
specially asked; because, when a man professes the keeping of such 
inn or public house, he thereby gives a general license to any person 
to enter his doors.”281 The license is not a universal right to enter.282
But to justify any limitation a reason must be offered:  
[I]f an inn-keeper, or other victualler, hangs out a sign and opens his house 
for travellers [sic], it is an implied engagement to entertain all persons 
who travel that way; and upon this universal assumpsit an action will lie 
against him for damages, if he without good reason refuses to admit a 
traveller.283
Two opposing errors must be avoided here. On one hand, it 
would be a mistake to assume that anyone has a right to be served in 
any business establishment. A duty to provide access to public 
accommodations on equal terms is not a duty to provide services.284
On the other hand, cases such as Wood v. Leadbitter285 and Marrone 
v. Washington Jockey Club286 have long been read for the broad 
proposition that a license is revocable at the will of the licensor 
without reason.287 The lesson drawn from this is that the common law 
nondiscrimination norm attaches only to common carriers and public 
utilities at common law.288 But Joseph Singer has called that view 
 281. II BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *212. 
 282. Markham v. Brown, 8 N.H. 523, 528 (N.H. 1837) (“Holding it out as a 
place of accommodation for travellers [sic], [an innkeeper] cannot prohibit persons 
who come under that character, in a proper manner, and at suitable times, from 
entering, so long as he has the means of accommodation for them. But he is not 
obliged to make his house a common receptacle for all comers, whatever may be 
their character or condition.”).  
 283. III BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *166.  
 284. See Fell v. Spokane Transit Auth., 911 P.2d 1319, 1329 (Wash. 1996). 
 285. 13 M. & W. 838, 845 (Eng. 1845). 
 286. 227 U.S. 633, 637 (1913). 
 287. See Ralph W. Aigler, Revocability of Licenses—The Rule of Wood v. 
Leadbitter, 13 MICH. L. REV. 401, 402 (1915). 
 288. See, e.g., Alfred Avins, What Is a Place of “Public” Accommodation?,
52 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 2-7 (1968); Earl M. Maltz, “Separate But Equal” and the Law 
of Common Carriers in the Era of the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 553, 
553-54 (1986). 
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“almost certainly wrong,”289 arguing that the rules of Jim Crow 
permitting and requiring owners to exclude without valid reason was 
in important respects a departure from, not a continuation of, the 
common law norms governing public accommodations.290
Some of the common law’s complexity has not fully emerged 
in those competing accounts. The nondiscrimination norms of 
common law are plural and vary according to the kind of enterprise 
conducted and the type of property utilized. Common carriers 
(railroads and public utilities with delegated monopoly power) alone 
have a general duty to serve.291 Owners of public accommodations 
(barbershops, inns) have no general duty to serve,292 though they do 
have a duty to give good reason for any denial of equal access.293
Any good reason will suffice, even a personal reason.294 And those 
engaged in a private calling (professionals and service professionals, 
amusement and sporting venues) have no common law duty to serve 
or to provide reasons for refusing to serve.295
The record has perhaps grown clouded in part because courts 
have not always expressly distinguished between and among 
(1) licenses emanating from state-created monopolies, (2) licenses 
emanating from a delegation of the owner’s own authority in private 
property, and (3) licenses emanating from contract. The licenses in 
Leadbitter and Marrone were created by tickets, in the nature of 
contracts, giving rise to revocable privileges, and the powers of 
ownership remained with the private owners.296 As Justice Holmes 
 289. See Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public 
Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1294 (1996). 
 290. Id. at 1303-73. For the reasons stated below, Singer’s conclusion, that 
owners of public accommodations do not enjoy a right to exclude, does not follow 
from this and in fact is contrary to the law. Id. at 1312-19.
 291. See Avins, supra note 288, at 2-3. 
 292. See Feldt v. Marriott Corp., 322 A.2d 913, 915 (D.C. Ct. App. 1974); 
Curtis v. Murphy, 22 N.W. 825, 827 (Wis. 1885). 
 293. Id. What that duty entails depends upon further distinctions, as between 
a restaurant, an inn, a retail store, etc. Id. at 916. Even finer gradations emerge upon 
closer examination of ancillary duties; a restaurant, for example, is found more to 
resemble a retail store than an inn. See Davidson v. Chinese Republic Rest., 167 
N.W. 967, 969 (Mich. 1918). 
 294. See Noble v. Higgins, 158 N.Y.S. 867, 867-68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1916). 
 295. See Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058, 1058 (Ind. 1901); Tamelleo v. 
N.H. Jockey Club, Inc., 163 A.2d 10, 12-13 (N.H. 1960); Madden v. Queens Cty. 
Jockey Club, 269 A.D. 644, 645-46 (N.Y. App. Div. 1945); Rice v. Rinaldo, 119 
N.E.2d 657, 659 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951). 
 296. 8 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY §§ 64.03(c), (d) (David A. Thomas ed., 
3d ed. 2016). 
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explained in Marrone, “The fact that the purchase of the ticket made 
a contract is not enough. A contract binds the person of the maker, 
but does not create an interest in the property that it may concern, 
unless it also operates as a conveyance.”297 The scope of the license 
is determined by the contract, not by a right in rem, and the remedy 
for revocation sounds in breach of contract.298
The racetrack owners in Leadbitter and Marrone, who required 
a ticket purchase to gain entrance, were precisely not opening their 
premises to the general public; rather they were opening only to 
those who purchased tickets.299 Even in cases of contractual licenses, 
the general arbitrariness of racial discrimination might protect those 
who are willing and able to satisfy the terms on which contracts are 
extended because the rights of citizenship include a right not to be 
denied service for reasons that do not apply alike to all persons. But 
race is sui generis; the law contains no general duty not to 
discriminate.300
Blackstone explained that where a license derives from 
contract—either implied contract with someone engaged in a general 
undertaking or a special agreement with someone who is in a private 
vocation—the terms are determined by express or implied covenants 
in the agreement.301 No one has a duty to contract with anyone else. 
And no one has a duty to contract on any particular terms. It follows 
that no one has a right to require someone else to do business with 
someone. Any business that is voluntarily contracted is governed by 
the terms of the contract. 
By contrast, if the license derives from opening property to the 
public, then the license is a delegation of part of the owner’s 
dominion over the premises, and the scope of the licensee’s right is 
shaped by the purpose for which the owner holds open.302 In such 
cases, the licensor may only refuse access for a “good reason.”303
 297. Marrone v. Wash. Jockey Club, 227 U.S. 633, 636 (1913). 
 298. Id.
 299. See 8 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 296, at § 64.03(d). 
 300. Compare Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697, 702-03 (3d Cir. 1949) 
(holding that African-Americans had right to access private swimming pool which 
was opened to whites), with Hedding v. Gallagher, 57 A. 225, 226-27 (N.H. 1903) 
(holding truckmen have no common law right to solicit baggage-transfer business at 
railroad station, though others are allowed to do so). 
 301. See III BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *164. 
 302. Commenting on cases such as State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971), 
Adam Mossoff has observed that farmers who house migrant workers on their farms 
have vested in those workers a license, which entails the right to receive on the 
premises others whose “presence [is] related to [their] work.” Mossoff, supra note 
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Refusing to serve alcohol to an intoxicated person or to admit 
to an inn a known thief are valid reasons for discrimination.304 By 
contrast, the racial identity of the would-be licensee is per se not a 
valid reason.305 As the Supreme Court of Michigan put it, to refuse 
service to a person “for no other reason than” that person’s race is 
contrary to the “absolute, unconditional equality of white and 
colored men before the law.”306 It is, therefore, “not for the courts to 
cater to or temporize with a prejudice which is not only not humane, 
but unreasonable.”307
In that case, a restaurateur had refused to serve black patrons in 
one part of his establishment, though he offered to serve them in 
another; white patrons were permitted to be served wherever they 
wanted.308 In a subsequent civil action by the black patrons, the trial 
judge allowed the claim to go to a jury with the instruction that the 
owner had “no right to make a rule providing for an unjust 
discrimination, still he would have the right, under the law, to make 
proper and reasonable rules for the conduct of his business.” He 
might reasonably, for example, maintain separate parts of his dining 
facilities for ladies and gentlemen, or segregate restaurant patrons 
from boarders. The trial judge told the jury that “whether this was a 
reasonable rule I will submit to you for determination.”309
In reversing, the Supreme Court of Michigan stated that the 
trial “judge was eminently sound in his reasoning, and correct in his 
law, but in his application of the law to this particular case he was in 
error. The jury, under the defendant’s own version of the transaction, 
                                                                                                       
279, at 260. As the Maine high court recognized in the analogous case of State v. 
DeCoster, 653 A.2d 891, 893-94 (Me. 1995), property devices such as licenses and 
leases contain implied covenants, and therefore the limitations on the owner’s right 
to exclude are built in by private ordering, prior to any state action. 
 303. See III BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *164; Markham v. Brown, 
8 N.H. 523, 529 (1837). The racetrack owners in Leadbitter and Marrone, who 
required a ticket purchase to gain entrance, were not opening their premises to the 
general public but rather opening only to those who purchased tickets. See supra,
notes 285-86 and accompanying text.  
 304. See Markham, 8 N.H. at 528-29. 
 305. Coger v. Nw. Union Packet Co., 37 Iowa 145, 154 (1873) (“The 
doctrines of natural law and of christianity forbid that rights be denied on the ground 
of race or color; and this principle has become incorporated into the paramount law 
of the Union.”); Messenger v. State, 41 N.W. 638, 639 (Neb. 1889). 
 306. Ferguson v. Gies, 46 N.W. 718, 719-20 (Mich. 1890). 
 307. Id. at 721. 
 308. Id. at 718-19. 
 309. Id. at 719. 
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should have been instructed to find a verdict for the plaintiff.”310 A 
statute making it a misdemeanor to fail to provide “full and equal 
accommodations” meant not identical accommodations but rather the 
same accommodation.311 The restaurant owner’s counsel noted that 
the statute imposed criminal liability and argued that it could 
therefore not be the basis of a civil action.312 But the court rejected 
this characterization of the law. It was not necessary for the 
legislature to specify a civil remedy because the unwritten law of 
property prohibited racial discrimination. The statute was “only 
declaratory of the common law.”313
This statement is a key to understanding the common law 
doctrine of public accommodations. “Declaratory” is a term of art in 
common law jurisprudence signifying what is already commanded or 
prohibited by the unwritten law, which includes the laws of nature 
and of nature’s God, customs so ancient that the memory of man 
runs not to the contrary, and the maxims. By the declaratory part of 
civil law are the “rights to be observed, and the wrongs to be 
eschewed” specified and expressly posited,314 but they are not made 
law by being declared and posited. They exist before they are 
posited. They are derived not from the legislature’s will but rather 
from the natural rights, natural duties, general and local customs, and 
acts of private ordering (including the creation of licenses) that 
precede positive law. They would be authoritative even without 
being declared by positive lawmakers.315
Some of that ancient, unwritten law which the municipal 
(positive) law declares is universal and immutable.316 And “upon the 
 310. Id.
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. at 720.  
 313. Id.
 314. I BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *53. 
 315. Id. at *42, *54, *86. 
 316. Blackstone explained the idea this way: 
Those rights then which God and nature have established, and are 
therefore called natural rights, such as are life and liberty, need not the aid 
of human laws to be more effectually invested in every man than they are; 
neither do they receive any additional strength when declared by the 
municipal laws to be inviolable. On the contrary, no human legislature has 
power to abridge or destroy them, unless the owner shall himself commit 
some act that amounts to a forfeiture. Neither do divine or natural duties
(such as, for instance, the worship of God, the maintenance of children, 
and the like) receive any stronger sanction from being also declared to be 
duties by the law of the land. 
Id. at *54.  
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whole, the declaratory part of the municipal law has no force or 
operation at all, with regard to actions that are naturally and 
intrinsically right or wrong.”317 The positive enactment (the 
municipal law) simply declares what is already required and 
prohibited. Because we are obligated to obey our natural duties and 
to respect others’ natural rights, we are “bound by superior laws, 
before those human laws were in being, to perform the one and 
abstain from the other.”318 Natural rights and duties thus stand in 
contrast to positive privileges and obligations, which bind us only 
because and insofar as positive law attaches sanction to particular 
conduct, and to those matters about which natural and divine law are 
indifferent.319
The Michigan Supreme Court thus used a concise phrase to 
communicate the commonplace notion that the duty to make public 
accommodations equally available to blacks and whites is grounded 
in natural and divine law. It is required by right reason, whatever 
positive law provides. This does not entail that one has a natural right 
to enter private property, even if that property is a public 
accommodation. The rights and duties of private law are specified by 
private law authorities—e.g., property owners—just as the rights and 
duties of what Blackstone called municipal law are specified by 
public authorities. But all rights and duties must be specified within 
the bounds of what reason will allow. Reason forbids arbitrary 
distinctions, such as racial discrimination. Because it is intrinsically 
unreasonable, and therefore wrong, to discriminate on the basis of 
race, whatever privileges a property owner extends to a white person 
must also be extended to a black person. 
The Michigan court explained, 
The common law as it existed in this state before the passage of this 
statute, and before the colored man became a citizen under our 
constitution and laws, gave to the white man a remedy against any unjust 
discrimination to the citizen in all public places. It must be considered 
that, when this suit was planted, the colored man, under the law of this 
state, was entitled to the same rights and privileges in public places as the 
white man, and must be treated the same there; and that his right of action 
for any injuries arising from an unjust discrimination against him is just as 
perfect and sacred in the courts as that of any other citizen.320
 317. Id.
 318. Id. at *57. 
 319. See generally MacLeod, Rights, Privileges, and the Future of Marriage 
Law, supra note 50. 
 320. Ferguson v. Gies, 46 N.W. 718, 720 (1890). 
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No reason could be found for the racial segregation, and 
therefore, racial segregation was not among the powers of the 
restaurant owner. The Michigan Court acknowledged that other state 
courts had permitted racial segregation in public accommodations, 
but did not concede that those decisions were consistent with the 
common law governing public accommodations. “The cases which 
permit in other states the separation of the African and the white 
races in public places can only be justified on the principle that God 
made a difference between them, which difference renders the 
African inferior to the white . . . .”321 That idea “does not commend 
itself either to the heart or judgment.”322 It “is not only not humane, 
but unreasonable.”323 Even accepting the contorted premise that 
being born black was some sort of deformity, reason forbids inferior 
treatment. “Because it was divinely ordained that the skin of one 
man should not be as white as that of another furnishes no more 
reason that he should have less rights and privileges under the law 
than if he had been born white, but cross-eyed, or otherwise 
deformed.”324
B. Categorical, Not Absolute, Rights and Privileges 
None of this necessarily makes public accommodations law 
public; these remain private rights and duties unless and until 
criminal sanction is added to them. It must be remembered that any 
duty to serve runs not to the state or the political community as a 
whole but to one’s customers. Furthermore, the common law 
nondiscrimination norm is not one-size-fits-all. The customers’ 
license is limited by any good reason that the owner can articulate 
for exclusion. That an owner’s dominion is circumscribed by duties, 
limitations on his rights, and other norms of obligation does not 
entail that the state has the power to enforce those norms on its own 
initiative or to determine and specify the content and scope of those 
norms in its own judgment.325 As shown in previous Parts, the 
positive law norms are undetermined in the abstract. Any claim to 
determine them for some collective good, once for everyone, is 
 321. Id.
 322. Id. at 721. 
 323. Id.
 324. Id.
 325. Compare Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in 
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 748-49 (2009), with MACLEOD,
P&PR, supra note 14, at 198, 216-17. 
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incoherent because the basic human goods at stake are 
incommensurable.326
A property owner who holds her resource open to the public 
accepts a new limitation on her right to exclude, which did not exist 
when her property was not open to the public. On the other side, 
though a customer’s license to enter a public accommodation is not a 
right, it is a privilege subject to the owner’s right to revoke for any 
good reason. The owner’s categorical duty not to discriminate on the 
basis of race makes the customer’s license look like an absolute right 
in cases of racial discrimination. But the license remains revocable 
for other, valid reasons. The license is not an absolute right; far from 
it. Discrimination and exclusion are permitted, even right and proper 
in some cases. 
What counts as a good or valid reason for exclusion is 
determined in the first place according to the purpose for which the 
license or tenancy was created because the reason for admitting some 
entails that it would be arbitrary or irrational to exclude some 
others.327 The validity of reasons can also be determined by other 
context-specific factors, and there is no basis in law to exclude from 
these the owner’s moral convictions. A pub owner might reasonably 
and lawfully exclude a potential patron who has already had three or 
four drinks and who the pub owner knows is sometimes abusive 
toward his wife when drunk. The pub owner might have no legal 
obligation to prevent domestic violence in the patron’s home, yet a 
jury could quite reasonably conclude that the pub owner acted within 
his right by sending the patron home without serving him any more 
alcohol. 
Therefore, the line between the owner’s right and the 
customer’s license is not settled once and for all as matter of uniform 
conclusiveness. The scope of a property license is a fact question.328
The judgment varies from case to case according to the purpose for 
the license or estate, the owner’s moral convictions, local customs 
and traditions, and many other case-specific facts.329 In cases of 
 326. Compare Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 
858 (2009), with FINNIS, NLNR, supra note 18, at 113; MACLEOD, P&PR, supra
note 14, at 217-18. 
 327. See State v. DeCoster, 653 A.2d 891, 894 (Me. 1995); MacLeod, 
P&PR, supra note 14, at 37-63. See also Curtis v. Murphy, 22 N.W. 825, 826-27 
(Wis. 1885) (man not entitled to be guest of inn where he went for purpose of 
engaging prostitute). 
 328. See Jackson v. Rounseville, 46 Mass. 127, 130 (1842). 
 329. Id. at 130-31.  
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dispute, adjudication of the boundaries between the customer’s 
privilege and the owner’s right is entrusted to another common law 
institution of private ordering, the civil jury,330 which is comprised of 
members of the owner’s and customer’s community. The liberty of 
the owner and privilege of the customer are thus both settled in law 
prior to any interference by the state. 
The rule against racial discrimination is a particularly 
conclusive, universal judgment drawn from this otherwise-
indeterminate body of property law. Because race is an arbitrary 
characteristic, to refuse service to a person for no reason other than 
that person’s race has always been unreasonable at common law. The 
common law secures the owner’s right to exclude for any good 
reason, and race is per se not a good reason. Therefore, 
Reconstruction-era statutes that prohibited racial discrimination by 
common carriers and in public accommodations neither created new 
rights nor deprived owners of any property. That is why they did not 
implicate the Takings Clause and other constitutional limitations on 
expropriations; nothing was expropriated. 
C. Recovering the Plural Norms of Public Accommodations Law 
Three important implications follow from this. First, sexual 
identity might in many cases be similar to race in the sense that it is 
generally irrelevant to the purpose for which a public 
accommodation is held open. As with race, there are likely to be few 
cases in which sexual identity constitutes a valid reason for 
exclusion. So a state might reasonably prohibit discrimination in 
public accommodations for the reason of sexual identity. 
Second, many valid reasons for discrimination and exclusion 
remain valid, even right, though the effects of an owner’s policy 
might fall disproportionately on people who identify with a particular 
sexual orientation. Distinctions between natural marriage and other 
sexual relations, and between status and conduct, are valid reasons, 
which are grounded in law. So, for example, those state courts that 
have affirmed a property owner’s refusal to rent to an unmarried, 
cohabitating couple have observed that long-standing state laws, 
which codify common law norms against unmarried cohabitation, 
reinforce the status–conduct distinction.331 These distinctions are also 
 330. Id. at 131-32. 
 331. E.g., N.D. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Peterson, 625 N.W.2d 551, 557 
(N.D. 2001). 
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grounded in religious beliefs,332 moral convictions,333 philosophical 
arguments,334 and combinations of those reasons.335 Further, reasoned 
arguments are made today in favor of traditional man-woman (or 
“conjugal”) marriage,336 same-sex marriage,337 plural marriages,338
and even minimalist marriage.339
The distinction that Muslims, Jews, Christians, and others draw 
between traditional marriage and all other relationships is another 
valid reason for exclusion, which is grounded in law. Indeed, it is 
foundational to the laws of all fifty states; the jural relations of the 
natural family precede positive law and have been basic within the 
fundamental law of the states since before the ratification of the 
Constitution and Bill of Rights.340 Even States that have redefined 
marriage to extend legal recognition to same-sex couples, such as 
Massachusetts and New York, retain in their laws the distinction 
 332. See generally TIMOTHY KELLER & KATHY KELLER, THE MEANING OF 
MARRIAGE (2013); Nashville Declaration on “Same-Sex Marriage”, ETHICS &
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY COMMISSION, (Mar. 9, 2005), http://mail.erlc.com/article 
/nashville-declaration-on-same-sex-marriage [https://perma.cc/D3GP-H5GS].  
 333. See generally ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE, MARRIAGE: THE DREAM 
THAT REFUSES TO DIE (Sheila O’Connor-Amrose ed., 2008). 
 334. See generally SHERIF GIRGIS, RYAN T. ANDERSON, & ROBERT P.
GEORGE, WHAT IS MARRIAGE?: MAN AND WOMAN: A DEFENSE (2012); PATRICK LEE 
& ROBERT P. GEORGE, CONJUGAL UNION: WHAT MARRIAGE IS AND WHY IT MATTERS
(2014).
 335. See generally CHRISTOPHER KACZOR & JENNIFER KACZOR, THE SEVEN 
BIG MYTHS ABOUT MARRIAGE: WHAT SCIENCE, FAITH, AND PHILOSOPHY TEACH US
ABOUT LOVE AND HAPPINESS (2014). 
 336. See GERARD V. BRADLEY, ESSAYS ON LAW, RELIGION, AND MORALITY
61 (2014); ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 139 (1999); Sherif 
Girgis, Robert P. George & Ryan T. Anderson, What is Marriage?, 34 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 245 (2011); Patrick Lee & Robert P. George, What Sex Can Be: Self-
Alienation, Illusion, or One-Flesh Union, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 135 (1997). See also
Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885). 
 337. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Andrew 
Koppelman, Judging the Case Against Same-Sex Marriage, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV.
431 (2014). 
 338. See generally RONALD C. DEN OTTER, IN DEFENSE OF PLURAL 
MARRIAGE (2015). 
 339. See generally ELIZABETH BRAKE, MINIMIZING MARRIAGE: MARRIAGE,
MORALITY, AND THE LAW (2012). 
 340. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 
816, 845 (1977); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 
(1942); STONER, supra note 10, at 83; David F. Forte, The Framers’ Idea of 
Marriage and Family, in THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE: FAMILY, STATE, MARKET,
AND MORALS 100, 102 (Robert P. George & Jean Bethke Elshtain eds., 2006). 
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between natural marriage and same-sex marriages for many 
purposes, especially the presumption of paternity,341 incest 
prohibitions,342 and other incidents of marriage that connect children 
to their biological parents.343 If it is reasonable for the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts to maintain the distinction between 
natural marriage and same-sex marriages, then surely reasonable 
jurors could conclude that an evangelical Protestant innkeeper or a 
school operated by Roman Catholic nuns enjoys the liberty to refrain 
from abrogating that distinction. 
Third, the parties have a constitutional right to have any 
remaining dispute submitted to a civil jury. What the owner’s actual 
motivation was and whether it is a valid reason are fact questions. 
And because the owner’s property right and the customer’s license 
are common law rights, the jury trial right pertains to their 
adjudication. Statutory and equitable rights (which are more properly 
called concessions of privilege) are entirely creations of positive law 
or the exercise of equitable discretion, respectively, and may 
therefore be adjudicated by whatever proceeding is appropriate to the 
venue.344 By contrast, rights and duties that precede positive law in 
their origin and that are not inherently equitable, especially 
customary common law rights and duties, are specified and settled as 
conclusive judgments by the institution that the common law has 
always employed for the purpose, the jury.345 The fundamental right 
to a jury trial is an important security for those rights that are part of 
our fundamental law. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has muddled this 
distinction in part with its “public rights” exception to the Seventh 
 341. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 6(a)(1) (2016). 
 342. E.g., ch. 272, § 17; Nguyen v. Holder, 21 N.E.3d 1023, 1025-26 (N.Y. 
2014) (Smith, J., concurring). 
 343. See generally MacLeod, Rights, Privileges, and the Future of Marriage 
Law, supra note 50, at 71-72. 
 344. E.g., Stevenson v. King, 10 So. 2d 825, 826 (Ala. 1942); Franchise Tax 
Bd. v. Superior Court, 252 P.3d 450, 452 (Cal. 2011); Martin v. Heinold 
Commodities, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 734, 752-53 (Ill. 1994); State v. Burns, 602 N.W.2d 
477, 482-84 (Neb. 1999); Young v. City of LaFollette, 479 S.W.3d 785, 793 (Tenn. 
2015).
 345. E.g., Ex Parte Moore, 880 So. 2d 1131, 1137 (Ala. 2003); People v. 
One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 231 P.2d 832, 843-44 (Cal. 1951); Wisden v. Superior 
Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 523, 527 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Anzaldua v. Band, 550 
N.W.2d 544, 554 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996), aff’d, 578 N.W.2d 306 (Mich. 1998); 
FUD’s, Inc. v. State, 727 A.2d 692, 695-99 (R.I. 1999). 
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Amendment trial right,346 and in part because it has mistakenly 
characterized some common law civil rights as statutory and public 
rights.347 This confusion has spread to some state courts, which, when 
interpreting their state constitutions, have failed to identify the 
common law foundations of discrimination norms in public 
accommodations.348 Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
correctly held that either the owner or the licensee may invoke the 
Seventh Amendment jury trial right in a civil rights dispute 
concerning access to a public accommodation.349 And many state 
courts have been even clearer that the civil jury trial right attaches to 
civil rights disputes that sound in common law doctrines, such as 
property and contract norms,350 that vindicate common law rights and 
duties,351 such as property rights,352 or that arise out of an action, 
right, or duty that is “analogous to”353 or a “modern variant of”354 a 
common law action, right, or duty. And the jury trial right attaches 
even if the action is adjudicated before a nondiscrimination 
commission.355
D. Mediating the Boundaries of Rights and Wrongs: The Civil Jury 
If the reader is now persuaded (or at least open to the idea) that 
the source of the difficulty is not public accommodations law, we 
can look elsewhere for sources. The public accommodations doctrine 
went off course when state and federal legislatures and judges pulled 
 346. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 450-55 (1977). 
 347. See generally Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964). See id. at 255-57 
(Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 293-94 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 348. See, e.g., Stonehill Coll. v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 808 
N.E.2d 205, 215 n.16 (Mass. 2004); Franklin Lodge of Elks v. Marcoux, 825 A.2d 
480, 489-90 (N.H. 2003). 
 349. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1974). 
 350. See, e.g., Loomis Elec. Prot., Inc. v. Schaefer, 549 P.2d 1341, 1345 
(Alaska 1976); Broward Cty. v. La Rosa, 505 So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla. 1987); Hoshijo 
v. Caracaus, 284 P.3d 932, 939-43 (Haw. Ct. App. 2012); State v. Credit Bureau of 
Laredo, Inc., 530 S.W.2d 288, 291-93 (Tex. 1975). 
 351. See, e.g., FUD’s, Inc. v. State, 727 A.2d 692, 698 (R.I. 1999). 
 352. See, e.g., La Rosa, 505 So. 2d at 424; Hoshijo, 284 P.3d at 939-43; 
Hanlon v. Town of Milton, 612 N.W.2d 44, 49 (Wis. 2000). 
 353. State v. O’Malley, 95 S.W.3d 82, 86 (Mo. 2003). 
 354. Id. at 87. 
 355. See SCI Mgmt. Corp. v. Sims, 71 P.3d 389, 397-98 (Haw. 2003). 
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it into the realm of public administration.356 Severed from its native 
institutions of license and civil jury, the doctrine was separated from 
practical reason357 and placed in the hands of rule-bound 
bureaucrats—nondiscrimination commissioners, executive agency 
officials, administrators of state-run universities—to which 
adjudication of public accommodations questions has increasingly 
been entrusted for the last half century or so. In their hands, a 
customer’s license is always transformed into an absolute claim-right 
if the customer identifies as a racial or sexual minority; one searches 
in vain for a case in which a nondiscrimination commission has not
found unlawful discrimination.358
In the hands of nondiscrimination commissars, the positive rule 
against discrimination on certain prohibited bases is almost 
universally transformed into a conclusive judgment that the owner 
has violated the rule. There is nothing left to adjudicate, and the 
owner’s dominion is extinguished without reference to the owner’s 
reasons for action; reasonableness has nothing to do with it. 
Indeterminacy is eliminated in part by bending facts toward the 
desired outcome. Nondiscrimination commissions have not yet 
shown themselves capable of rendering factual findings reliably 
consistent with the evidence. Indeed, they create the impression that 
 356. Epstein observes that the 1964 Civil Rights Act “authorizes 
administrative action by various government agencies, most notably the Department 
of Justice, the Office of Civil Rights in the Department of Education, and the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission.” Epstein, Freedom of Association, supra
note 3. And he reports that there “are civil rights divisions in virtually every 
government agency, most notably in the agencies that regulate housing, education, 
and employment.” Id.
 357. Epstein notes:  
Substantively, the application of the antidiscrimination norms is not 
tethered by any requirement that the government or a private claimant 
show there was any conscious intent to discriminate. It is easy for 
administrative agencies and courts to impose sanctions on practices that 
look innocent enough in themselves, but which are said to have a disparate 
impact on any of various groups—often measured only by statistical 
inference, without any direct evidence.
Id.
 358. This author perceives that such commissions are not always truly 
adjudicatory bodies, but rather are often advocates for claimants that are entrusted 
with investigatory, prosecutorial, and adjudicatory powers. One court characterized 
the advocacy of a nondiscrimination commission colorfully, “Anxious to fulfill its 
destiny as destroyer of discrimination, the Commission made ready to do battle, 
apparently to provide surcease for the sensitivities of those whom they clept 
‘Complainants.’” Prince George’s Cty. v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 431 A.2d 745, 746 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981). 
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they will find illegal discriminatory motive no matter what the 
evidence shows.359
A classic example is Attorney General v. Desilets,360 discussed 
above, which began in the Massachusetts Commission Against 
Discrimination (“Commission”). The Desilets testified that they were 
willing to rent to anyone, married or unmarried.361 What they could 
not do in good conscience was facilitate fornication. This testimony 
was uncontroverted.362 Nevertheless, the Commission found probable 
cause to believe that the Desilets had discriminated against Lattanzi 
and Tarail on the basis of marital status.363 The Commission’s fact 
finding was picked up by the Attorney General of Massachusetts, 
who filed suit against the Desilets on behalf of the complaining, 
cohabitating couple.364 And it was adopted uncritically by the trial 
court, which ruled that “the Attorney General had established a 
prima facie case of housing discrimination based on marital status” 
in violation of a state nondiscrimination statute.365 The trial court 
then granted summary judgment for the Desilets on the tenuous 
ground that the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause entitled the 
Desilets to discriminate on that prohibited basis.366 When the 
Attorney General appealed the trial court’s summary judgment ruling 
to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the Commission’s 
counterfactual finding of fact was thus annealed in the record.367
The Court vacated and remanded, ruling that the 
Commonwealth could require the Desilets to violate their conscience 
if it could articulate a compelling interest for doing so.368 The 
majority briefly mentioned the predicate factual finding that the 
Desilets had in fact discriminated on the basis of marital status.369 But 
it dismissed rather nonchalantly the Desilets’ argument “that they are 
not discriminating on the basis of marital status but rather on the 
 359. In addition to the cases cited above and the Desilets case discussed 
below, see Viering v. Fla. Comm’n on Human Relations, 109 So. 3d 296, 298-99 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
 360. Att’y Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994). 




 365. Brief for Plaintiff–Appellant at *2-3, Att’y Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 
233 (Mass. 1994) (No. SJC 06284), 1993 WL 13156912. 
 366. Id. at *3.  
 367. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 243.  
 368. Id.
 369. Id. at 235. 
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basis of conduct and that consequently they are not discriminating in 
a way forbidden by” the statute.370 “There is no merit to this 
argument,” the majority declaimed.371 It reasoned that: 
[A]nalysis of the defendants’ concerns shows that it is marital status and 
not sexual intercourse that lies at the heart of the defendants’ objection. If 
married couple A wanted to cohabit in an apartment owned by the 
defendants, they would have no objection. If unmarried couple B wanted 
to cohabit in an apartment owned by the defendants, they would have 
great objection. The controlling and discriminating difference between the 
two situations is the difference in the marital status of the two couples.372
This is a mischaracterization of the Desilets’ reasoning. The 
difference between couple A and couple B under the Desilets’ 
religiously informed policy is that the two couples are engaging in 
different conduct; marital status is only derivatively significant. The 
error is exposed by a hypothetical. Had two Roman Catholics nuns, 
having taken vows of chastity, applied to lease an apartment from the 
Desilets, they would have qualified under the Desilets’ policy though 
they were unmarried. For the same reason, had an adulterous couple, 
both married to other people, sought to rent an apartment they would 
have been declined though they were married. So, the Desilets’ 
policy did not prevent leasing to unmarried people. The Desilets 
objected to being forced to facilitate unmarried sexual intercourse, a 
particular kind of conduct. 
In dissent, Justice O’Connor correctly observed, 
In keeping with their sincerely held religious beliefs, the defendants 
consider an unmarried couple’s living together in a sexual relationship to 
be an offense against God. Also in keeping with their sincerely held 
religious beliefs, the defendants consider enabling or assisting another in 
the commission of an offense against God to be itself an offense against 
Him. Responding to those religious convictions, and out of respect for the 
will of God, the defendants refused to rent an apartment to an unmarried 
couple living in a sexual relationship (cohabiting couple).373
The majority, as O’Connor pointed out, had invented a right of 
unmarried couples to use others’ property to engage in unmarried 
cohabitation and given that right priority over the fundamental right 
freely to exercise one’s religion, which is expressly guaranteed in the 
Massachusetts Constitution.374
 370. Id.
 371. Id. 
 372. Id.
 373. Id. at 246 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 374. Id. at 246-47. 
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It does not take an expert in nondiscrimination rules to perceive 
the Desilets’ reasoning. The high courts of Minnesota,375 North 
Dakota,376 and other states have proven themselves capable of 
perceiving the distinction between married and unmarried 
cohabitation. They have been aided not by commissions and 
administrative agencies, which have uniformly proven incapable of 
grasping the distinction,377 but rather by legislative history.378
This is not to suggest that owners are free to refuse to rent 
apartments for any reason. Of course the contours of a license to 
enter a leasehold or accommodation, and the correlative boundaries 
of the owner’s right, must be specified in particular cases by some 
authority. Public authorities went wrong when they arrogated the 
power to perform this specification away from common law—
private ownership, the license, and civil juries—and placed it in the 
hands of those experts who fail to perceive common-sense 
distinctions, such as the difference between marriage and non-
marriage (see Elane Photography v. Willock),379 orientation and 
action (see Christian Legal Society v. University of California),380
and status and conduct (see Attorney General v. Desilets).381 Those 
are distinctions that normal people—the people who own property 
and sit on civil juries—routinely perceive and act upon without 
difficulty. 
The civil jury deserves reconsideration as an institution with 
potential to temper and resolve these conflicts in a principled way. In 
our legal tradition, the jury has long been viewed as both a 
representative of the conscience of the community and a bulwark of 
liberty. Its moral authority rests in its primary duty to discern, 
recognize, and declare the truth of the matter, whether the matter is a 
question of fact, a question of customary law, or a mixed question of 
fact and law.382 Its friendship with liberty is thought to consist partly 
 375. See, e.g., State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990). 
 376. See, e.g., N.D. Fair Hous. Council v. Peterson, 625 N.W.2d 551 (N.D. 
2001).
 377. See Smith v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909, 912-14 (Cal. 
1996); French, 460 N.W.2d at 4; McFadden v. Elma Country Club, 613 P.2d 146, 
151 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980). 
 378. See Peterson, 625 N.W.2d at 559-62; French, 460 N.W.2d at 6-7. 
 379. 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013). 
 380. 561 U.S. 661 (2010). 
 381. 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994). 
 382. SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, I THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 147-49 (2d ed., Liberty 
Fund 2010) (1898). 
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in its sympathy with the customs and norms of the community, 
bearing the community’s common sense.383 Thus, it is the voice of 
both justice and conventional morality. 
A judgment resting upon the jury’s verdict is thought to result 
in neither merely order nor merely liberty, but ordered liberty. What 
Nathan Chapman calls “the early American jury’s near-mythical 
status as ‘the grand Bulwark of LIBERTY,’”384 owes much to its 
resistance to overreaching governments, which Chapman recently 
chronicled,385 and the (civil) jury’s contributions to the virtues of 
civic republicanism, famously described by Tocqueville.386 Yet the 
jury also secures liberty in a much more prosaic way by specifying 
its boundaries consistent with the requirements of reason, the 
customs of the community, and other demands of conventional and 
critical morality. Liberty specified in this way is less likely to 
devolve into license than absolute liberty, and therefore poses a 
lesser threat to the common good. 
In a morally pluralistic age, it is sometimes denied that the 
community has any conscience to be expressed. Nor, if there is a 
community conscience, is there much confidence that the jury is 
capable of expressing it. For example, Robert Vischer concedes that 
the jury does not impose oppressive, top-down norms and is 
therefore less likely to threaten liberty than the state. But he thinks 
the notion of the jury as community conscience is “unhelpful.”387
Without a shared understanding of wrongs, only our positive laws 
can be said to identify “sins,” Vischer suggests.388 Therefore, it is not 
the jury verdict but rather the judge’s instructions to the jury that can 
be said to express the community conscience, to the extent that any 
such conscience exists. 
 383. Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part I), 2 
OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 155, 163-64 (2002); STONER, supra note 10, at 93-
94.
 384. Chapman, supra note 168, at 191 (quoting JOHN PHILLIP REID,
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF 
RIGHTS 49 (1986) (quoting Maryland Resolves, 28 Sept. 1765, in Maryland Votes 
and Proceedings 10 (Sept. 1765)). 
 385. Chapman, supra note 168, at 201-12. 
 386. “Juries, especially civil juries, help to instill into the minds of all the 
citizens something of the mental habits of judges, which are exactly those which 
best prepare the people to be free.” ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA 320 (Gerald E. Bevan trans., Penguin 2003) (1835). 
 387. VISCHER, CCG, supra note 4, at 32. 
 388. Id. at 31. 
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Yet the jury does not only apply positive law to the facts of 
cases. It also applies common law. As shown in previous Parts, much 
of that common law, and the positive law derived from it, is partly 
indeterminate in a way that not only invites, but actually requires the 
jury to exercise moral judgment and also directs that judgment at the 
boundaries. Examples abound. Reasonableness standards exist 
throughout the law, as do standards that require juries to adjudicate 
what intentions and actions are outrageous, unconscionable, or 
simply wrong. These standards are either undetermined or partially 
under-determined as legal norms until the jury determines all or 
some of their content. But they are not meaningless. 
In other words, the jury makes moral judgment as part of its 
normal function because many legal standards constitute 
exclusionary reasons that are not fully absolute, not completely 
peremptory, but only partly or categorically exclusionary of first-
order reasons for action. The jury is authorized and required to sift 
through many, or even all, of the first-order reasons offered as 
justifications by the parties, and to judge which of those first-order 
reasons for action are wrongful and which are right. This does not 
require any particular theological commitment. It simply requires 
jurors to exercise practical reason and draw upon their wisdom about 
the common good. 
VII. CONCLUSION
The resources to resolve the conflict between conscience and 
sexual identity are at hand. Though perhaps a little dull and dusty 
from lack of use, they have been sharpened somewhat by renewed 
scholarly interest in property as a meaningful, normative institution 
and by the United States Supreme Court’s reinvigorated property 
jurisprudence over the last couple of decades. Common law norms 
and institutions can help us construct a moral marketplace in which 
principles of justice are vindicated and pluralism allows individuals 
and communities to flourish.
